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1249 
TECHNOLOGICAL DUE PROCESS 
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Distinct and complementary procedures for adjudication and 
rulemaking lie at the heart of twentieth-century administrative law. Due 
process requires agencies to provide individuals notice and an opportunity 
to be heard. Through public rulemaking, agencies can foreclose policy 
issues that individuals might otherwise raise in adjudication. One system 
allows for focused advocacy; the other features broad participation. Each 
procedural regime compensates for the normative limits of the other. Both 
depend on clear statements of reason.  
The dichotomy between these procedural regimes is rapidly becoming 
outmoded. This century’s automated decision making systems combine 
individual adjudications with rulemaking while adhering to the procedural 
safeguards of neither. Automated systems jeopardize due process norms. 
Hearings are devalued by the lack of meaningful notice and by the hearing 
officer’s tendency to presume a computer system’s infallibility. The 
Mathews v. Eldridge cost-benefit analysis is ill-equipped to compare the 
high fixed cost of deciphering a computer system’s logic with the 
accumulating variable benefit of correcting myriad inaccurate decisions 
made based on this logic. Automation also defeats participatory 
rulemaking. Code, not rules, determines the outcomes of adjudications. 
Programmers inevitably alter established rules when embedding them into 
code in ways the public, elected officials, and the courts cannot review. 
Last century’s procedures cannot repair these accountability deficits.  
A new concept of technological due process is essential to vindicate the 
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norms underlying last century’s procedural protections. This Article will 
demonstrate how a carefully structured inquisitorial model of quality 
control can partially replace aspects of adversarial justice that 
automation renders ineffectual. It also provides a framework of 
mechanisms capable of enhancing the transparency, accountability, and 
accuracy of rules embedded in automated decision-making systems.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The executive branch grew exponentially in size and mission in the 
twentieth century.1 Administrative agencies wielded ever-increasing 
power, implementing comprehensive regulatory programs and distributing 
benefits to tens of millions of people.2 Congress and the courts allowed the 
administrative state to expand so long as it adhered to extensive 
procedures designed to ensure the fairness, transparency, and 
accountability of agencies’ decisions about particular individuals and their 
policymaking.3 Procedural due process protected the important interests of 
individuals while constraints on rulemaking served as legitimate 
substitutes for individual adjudications.4  
In the twentieth century, those procedures enjoyed mixed success. The 
administrative state faced serious criticism, ranging from agency capture5 
and the ossification of rulemaking6 to chronic backlogs7 and perceived 
 
 
 1. Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of the 
Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 473–74 (2003). 
 2. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 6–46 (1938). 
 3. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING 47–50 (3d ed. 2003); Levy & Shapiro, supra note 
1, at 473. 
 4. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 6.1 (3d ed. 1994) (explaining that guarantees of procedural due process in addition to rulemaking 
procedures found in administrative decisions provide basic structural protections for individuals); see, 
e.g., Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (providing due process protections to 
individuals subject to special tax because City levied tax on the basis of facts peculiar to individuals’ 
situations); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (finding no due 
process right to a hearing to challenge an across-the-board tax because “it is impracticable that every 
one should have a direct voice in [the] adoption” of a “rule of conduct” that “applies to more than a 
few people”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980) “[The Constitution] is 
overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand, with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual 
disputes (process writ small), and on the other, with what might capaciously be designated process writ 
large—with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of government.”) (citation 
omitted).  
 5. See THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF 
PUBLIC AUTHORITY 297–98 (1969) (criticizing agencies’ capture by organizations).  
 6. See JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION 7–16 (1988) 
(complaining that due to cost, agencies skirt informal rulemaking process by making policy in other 
ways); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle 
Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 305–06 (1987) (attributing decline in National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration’s rulemaking to the threat of reversal posed by judicial review). 
 7. See White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (D. Conn. 1976) (finding that the delays in 
the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) disability benefits appeals process denied applicants 
procedural due process); see also JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND 
APPEALS (1978); Maurice E.R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & 
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unfairness in agencies’ adjudicatory arms.8 Through it all, however, 
procedural due process and formal and informal rulemaking provided a 
common structure for debating and addressing concerns about the 
propriety of administrative actions.  
The twenty-first century’s automated decision-making systems bring 
radical change to the administrative state that last century’s procedural 
structures cannot manage. In the past, computer systems helped humans 
apply rules to individual cases.9 Now, automated systems have become the 
primary decision makers.10 These systems often take human decision 
making out of the process of terminating individuals’ Medicaid, food 
stamp, and other welfare benefits.11 Another of these systems targets 
people for exclusion from air travel.12 Computer programs identify parents 
believed to owe child support and instruct state agencies to file collection 
proceedings against those individuals.13 Voters are purged from the rolls 
without notice,14 and small businesses are deemed ineligible for federal 
contracts.15  
Champions of automated systems extol their cost savings.16 Because 
automation radically reduces the human role in executing government 
policy and programs, state and federal governments can cut staff and close 
field offices.17 Supporters also argue that automation ensures consistent 
 
 
POL’Y REV. 219, 260 (1995) (describing EEOC’s backlog of charges, which grew from 6,133 in 1966 
to 130,000 in 1977).  
 8. Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1987) (criticizing SSA’s means of reviewing the 
decisions of ALJs); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing a range of 
defects in SSA’s procedures).  
 9. For instance, Florida’s Department of Health and Human Services used computers to process 
Medicaid claims in the 1990s. David K. Rogers et al., Computer Delays Welfare Services, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 3, 1992, at A1. Today, Florida’s automated public benefits system known as 
ACCESS recommends eligibility and benefit determinations to eligibility workers who finalize the 
computer’s decisions. See infra note 112 (discussing Florida’s automated public benefits system).  
 10. Denise Kersten, Bytes vs. Brains, GOV’T EXEC., Sept. 1, 2005, at 30. 
 11. E.g., Computer Glitch Drops Some Medicare Patients in 18 CA Counties, INSIDE CMS, Mar. 
8, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4384599.  
 12. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. TO CONG. REQUESTERS, GAO-06-1031, 
TERRORIST WATCH LIST SCREENING: EFFORTS TO HELP REDUCE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE PUBLIC 2, 
14–18 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061031.pdf [hereinafter U.S. GAO, 
TERRORIST WATCH LIST]. 
 13. Susannah Zak Figura, Where’s Dad?, GOVT. EXEC., Dec. 1, 1998, at 12. 
 14. Letter from Juliet T. Hodgkins, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, to Sarah 
Ball Johnson, Executive Dir., Ky. State Bd. of Elections (May 11, 2006) (on file with author).  
 15. Kersten, supra note 10, at 30. 
 16. Kara Harris & Tiffany Dovey, Integrating Health and Human Services Delivery, in STATES 
OF TRANSITION: TACKLING GOVERNMENT’S TOUGHEST POLICY AND MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 
153–56 (William D. Eggers & Robert N. Campbell III eds., 2006). 
 17. Thomas H. Davenport & Jeanne G. Harris, Automated Decision Making Comes of Age, MIT 
SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 2005, at 83, 84; Kimberly Reeves, Million-Hour Madness, HOUSTON 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/2
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decisions: systems interpret rules in the same way in every case.18 
Computerized systems eliminate the hassle of physically visiting an 
agency’s office.19  
Automation offers all of this. But it also risks dismantling critical 
procedural safeguards at the foundation of administrative law. Whereas the 
differences between rulemaking and individual adjudications and their 
procedural safeguards animated twentieth-century administrative law,20 
today’s automated systems defy such classification. Computer programs 
seamlessly combine rulemaking and individual adjudications without the 
critical procedural protections owed either of them.21  
Automation generates unforeseen problems for the adjudication of 
important individual rights. Some systems adjudicate in secret, while 
others lack recordkeeping audit trails, making review of the law and facts 
supporting a system’s decisions impossible.22 Inadequate notice will 
 
 
PRESS, Apr. 28, 2005, at A1 (explaining Texas’s projection that its automated welfare-benefits system 
would allow the state to cut sixty percent of its eligibility workers within two years). Florida reduced 
its workforce at the Department of Children and Family Services by forty-three percent after 
automating its administration of public benefits. Harris & Dovey, supra note 16, at 155. 
 18. WILLIAM D. EGGERS, GOVERNMENT 2.0: USING TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE EDUCATION, 
CUT RED TAPE, REDUCE GRIDLOCK, AND ENHANCE DEMOCRACY 113 (2005). 
 19. William D. Eggers, Overcoming Obstacles to Technology-Enabled Transformation 6 (Inst. 
for Gov’t Innovation, Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Occasional Paper Series No. OPS-05-03, 2003), 
available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/overcoming_obstacles_eggers.pdf; see also Shane 
Peterson, Social Services Synchronicity, GOV’T TECH., Mar. 28, 2005, available at http://www. 
govtech.net/magazine/story.print.php?id=93498 (explaining that web-based automated public benefits 
system in Pennsylvania offers convenience of screening applicants online but that despite the 
advantages of web-based services, clients still seek help by going into county assistance offices). 
 20. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 4, § 1.8 at 31.  
 21. This Article uses the terms “rulemaking,” “policy-making,” “rule,” and “policy” to refer to 
agency action that affects the rights and duties of a large number of people. See sources cited supra 
note 4 (discussing procedures that apply to broad policy-making); 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000) (defining 
“rule” as “agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to 
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice 
requirements of an agency”). This Article employs the term “adjudication” to signal agency action 
taken against people in their individual capacity. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 4, § 6.2; see sources 
cited supra note 4 (describing due process protections afforded individuals in adjudications of their 
important rights). Agencies can, of course, make policy in a number of ways, including through case-
by-case adjudication, formal and informal rulemaking, interpretative rules, and policy statements. 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551 (defining rulemaking and adjudication), 553 (2000) (explaining that rulemaking 
procedures do not apply to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency 
procedure); see sources cited infra notes 251, 257 (describing interpretative rules and policy 
statements). Although this Article addresses different kinds of policy throughout, its main purpose is to 
demonstrate how automation impairs both the procedural due process provided by individual 
adjudication and the procedural protections governing rulemaking (the traditional substitute for 
procedural due process).  
 22. For example, the TSA’s “No Fly” program identifies individuals as terrorists without 
providing any notice. See infra notes 177–79, 196–97. The automated public benefits systems in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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discourage some people from seeking hearings and severely reduce the 
value of hearings that are held.23  
Even if an individual seeks and receives a hearing, a hearing officer’s 
belief that computer decisions are error-resistant increases the likelihood 
of inaccurate outcomes. Although expert testimony about a computer 
system’s reasoning could combat a hearing officer’s presumption that a 
computer decision is correct,24 a Mathews v. Eldridge25 cost-benefit 
analysis would likely deny such additional process due to its extreme cost. 
As a result, hearings may not provide individuals with opportunities to 
meaningfully challenge automated decisions. Changes must be made if 
procedural due process is to be effective in the twenty-first century.26  
Automation also impairs the rulemaking procedures that traditionally 
substituted for individualized consideration with procedural due process. 
Although programmers building automated systems may not intend to 
engage in rulemaking, they in fact do so. Programmers routinely change 
the substance of rules when translating them from human language into 
computer code.27 The resulting distorted rules effectively constitute new 
policy that can affect large numbers of people. 
The opacity of automated systems shields them from scrutiny.28 
Citizens cannot see or debate these new rules.29 In turn, the transparency, 
accuracy, and political accountability of administrative rulemaking are 
lost.30 Code writers lack the properly delegated authority and policy 
 
 
Colorado and Texas lack recordkeeping audit trails that record the facts and law at the heart of each 
mini-decision made by the computer. See infra notes 191–95. 
 23. Indeed, the lack of meaningful notice effectively prevents some individuals from receiving 
hearings. See infra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of notice to individuals who 
are erroneously labeled dead-beat parents and the default judgments against innocent individuals who 
never received notice of their dead-beat status).  
 24. See infra notes 243, 248–49 and accompanying text (discussing the potential value of expert 
testimony on a system’s logic at hearings to dispel automation bias). 
 25. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 26. Cf. Danielle Keats Citron, Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World: Voice over Internet 
Protocol and the Coming Implosion of Personal Jurisdiction Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 
1538–42 (2006) (offering solutions to theoretical conflict in personal jurisdiction analysis created by 
emerging telephony technologies). 
 27. See infra notes 123–31 and accompanying text (discussing distorted policy embedded in 
Colorado’s public benefits system known as CBMS). 
 28. Charles Vincent & Jean Camp, Looking to the Internet for Models of Governance, 6 ETHICS 
& INFO. TECH. 161, 161 (2004) (explaining that automated processes remove transparency).  
 29. James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1736, 1750–55 
(2005) (arguing that software’s opacity is unproblematic when code regulates online markets and 
Digital Rights Management Systems). The programmer determines a system’s responses but the user 
sees only the results of the software’s decisions. Id. 
 30. David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual 
Rights, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1124 & n.322 (2005) (noting that automation of eligibility 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/2
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expertise that might ameliorate such unintentional policymaking. They 
also usurp agency expertise when they inadvertently distort established 
policy. 
Expert agency deliberation is another casualty of the acceleration of 
automated decision making. Agencies may be increasingly inclined to 
adopt policies involving simple questions and answers that are easy to 
translate into code, even when strong substantive reasons favor a more 
nuanced approach.31 At the same time, agencies may forsake policies that 
require a human being to exercise discretion because these are more 
difficult to automate. A strong a priori preference for simplified policy 
over nuance and discretion narrows the field for the expertise model of 
administrative law.32 
In short, automation undermines several pivotal assumptions at the 
heart of twentieth-century administrative law. Under these rapidly eroding 
assumptions, agencies exercise broad discretion to pursue either 
adjudication or rulemaking,33 although whatever path an agency ultimately 
chooses bears a distinct set of procedures.34 These procedures, which are 
the essence of an individual’s due process rights, begin with an agency’s 
statement of reasons for its intended actions.35 In agency adjudications, 
assessments of hearing officers’ partiality hinge upon their connections 
with the parties appearing before them.36 Furthermore, the traditional due 
 
 
determinations for public-benefits programs risks transparency since state employees may not be 
aware of extent to which an automated program deviates from state or federal policy). 
 31. Rochelle Hahn explains that in Massachusetts, information technology specialists dissuaded 
agency decision makers from adopting public benefits policies that would be difficult and expensive to 
automate. Comments of Rochelle Hahn, Website Coordinator for Massachusetts Legal Services, 
Podcast, Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, “Danielle Citron on 
Technological Due Process,” Jan. 15, 2008, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mediaberkman/2008/01/15/ 
danielle-citron-on-technological-due-process-podcast/.  
 32. Congress and the courts delegated power to agencies largely on the basis that agencies could 
develop the kind of expertise that legislators could not. LANDIS, supra note 2, at 23 (“[Expertise] 
springs only from that continuity of interest, that ability and desire to devote fifty-two weeks a year, 
year after year, to a particular problem.”); see also Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151–53 (1991) (deferring to Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of regulation 
because Secretary’s involvement with everyday enforcement gave her expertise that explained, in part, 
Congress’s delegation of rulemaking functions to Secretary); Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code 
Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming Sept. 2008) (discussing expert model of 
administrative law). 
 33. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 291 (1974) (ruling that the choice between 
rulemaking and adjudication lies within the agency’s discretion). 
 34. See sources cited supra note 4 (discussing different procedural regimes governing individual 
adjudications and rulemaking).  
 35. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) (ruling that 
fundamental requirement of due process is provision of notice reasonably calculated under the 
circumstances to apprise parties of nature of action). 
 36. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 700–03 (1948) (finding no violation 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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process cost-benefit analysis is structured so that the significant costs are 
almost always the variable ones, and are replicated in all future 
adjudications.37 Lastly, agencies can engage in legislative-type rulemaking 
only after seeking and considering the public’s input.38 All of these 
assumptions are fast becoming obsolete in this automated age.  
Consider the following illustrations of failed automated systems. The 
Colorado Benefits Management System (CBMS) has issued hundreds of 
thousands of incorrect Medicaid, food stamp, and welfare eligibility 
determinations and benefit calculations since its launch in September 
2004.39 Many of these errors can be attributed to programmers’ incorrect 
translations of hundreds of rules into computer code.40 As a result, CBMS 
imposed rules that, in their translated form, distorted federal and state 
policy without providing required opportunities for public input.41 Even 
after years of efforts to correct the system, affected individuals still cannot 
readily determine if errors made by CBMS stem from incorrectly 
translated rules or from mistaken factual adjudications. Had the failure of 
CBMS been less catastrophic, and thus less noticeable, the system’s 
invalid rules might well have remained hidden. 
Every week, approximately 1,500 airline travelers reportedly are 
mislabeled as terrorists due to errors in the data-matching program known 
as the “No Fly” list.42 Innocent individuals face extensive questioning and 
miss flights, never knowing why the automated system has targeted 
them.43 Individuals on the “No Fly” list have no assured means to clear 
 
 
of procedural due process for administrative judge to sit on case after he expressed an opinion as to 
whether certain types of conduct were prohibited by law). 
 37. See infra notes 244–47 and accompanying text (discussing the high cost of providing 
hearings in future cases under the traditional Mathews v. Eldridge due process analysis). 
 38. See Kerwin, supra note 3, at 158 (“[T]he legitimacy of the rulemaking process is clearly 
linked to public participation.”). 
 39. Jerd Smith, Audit: Costly Errors in Computer System for Benefits Had High Mistake Rate, 
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 19, 2006, at 4A. Before CBMS went live, the error rate for food stamp 
decisions was approximately 2.93%. Id. In 2005, a year after Colorado launched CBMS, the food 
stamp error rate stood at 7.42% whereas the national error rate was 5.48%. Id.  
 40. See infra notes 123 & 144. 
 41. See, e.g., Boatman v. Hammons, 164 F.3d 286, 288 (6th Cir. 1998) (enforcing requirements 
that states consult their medical care advisory committees before changing Medicaid policy); 7 C.F.R. 
§ 272.3(d) (2007) (“State agencies shall solicit public input and comment on overall Program 
operations as State laws require or as the individual State agency believes would be useful.”). 
 42. Greg Gordon, ‘Data Mining’ May Implicate Innocent People in Search for Terrorists, 
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Jan. 9, 2007, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/greg_gordon/story/ 
15339.html; see also Ryan Singel, Feds’ Watch List Eats Its Own, WIRED NEWS, May 4, 2006, 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/05/70783.  
 43. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 182 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/2
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their names and could be detained every time they attempt to board an 
airplane.44 
The data-mining algorithms45 of the Terrorist Surveillance Program 
(TSP) automatically search databases containing the telephone and email 
records of millions of Americans, creating lists of people who fit terrorist 
profiles.46 Serious concerns have been raised not only about TSP’s 
legality,47 but also about the crudeness of the algorithms it employs and 
the inaccurate information upon which it relies.48 Unsophisticated 
algorithms and faulty data generate high rates of false positives that might 
serve as a basis for baseless, stigmatizing criminal investigations.49  
The automated Federal Parent Locator Service has erroneously 
identified individuals as “dead-beat” parents who owe child support.50 
Some of these mistakenly identified individuals never receive notice of 
their alleged dead-beat status before their wages are garnished and their 
credit is impaired.51 These systems offend basic norms of due process by 
failing to provide both notice of the basis of their decisions and the means 
to review them. 
 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. In computing, the term algorithm refers to a “mechanical or recursive computational 
procedure.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 93 (21st College ed. 1985). 
 46. Scott Shane & David Johnston, Mining of Data Prompted Fight over U.S. Spying, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2007, at 16. The TSP mines information from databases maintained by AT&T, 
Verizon, and BellSouth. Declan McCullagh, FAQ: NSA’s Data Mining Explained, C/NETNEWS.COM, 
May 17, 2006, http://www.news.com/FAQ-NSAs-data-mining-explained/2100-1028_3-6071780.html. 
Those databases include information about the parties to conversations and the duration of calls. Id.  
 47. On July 6, 2007, the Sixth Circuit dismissed a case challenging the constitutionality of TSP, 
finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 687–88 
(6th Cir. 2007). In August 2007, Congress voted to authorize warrantless surveillance and interception 
of phone calls and emails of American citizens with little supervision by the courts. Jim Rutenberg, 
Wielding the Threat of Terrorism, Bush Outmaneuvers the Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at 
A1. The bill expires within six months. Id.  
 48. Shane Harris, NSA Program Broader than Previously Described, GOVERNMENT 
EXECUTIVE.COM, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0306/031706nj1. htm; Bruce 
Schneier, Commentary, Why Data Mining Won’t Stop Terror, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 9, 2006, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/03/70357; Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of U.S. Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft), 
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju87536.000/ hju87536_0.HTM. 
 49. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PUB. NO. RL31798, DATA MINING AND HOMELAND 
SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL31798.pdf 
[hereinafter CRS, DATA MINING]; Harris, supra note 48; Schneier, supra note 48.  
 50. Megan Garvey, Net to Snag Deadbeats Also Snares Innocent, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1998, at 
B1. 
 51. Stephanie Walton, The Real Cost of Unreliable Child Support Data 1, 2 (National Conf. of 
State Legislatures, Legislative Brief No. 0190001220, 2004); see Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of 
Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 241, 295 (2007) (exploring how an individual’s credit-worthiness is critical to market identity and 
personhood in the twenty-first century). 
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These examples leave no doubt that the procedural guarantees of the 
last century have been overmatched by the technologies of this one. Due to 
the public’s crushing demand for services, and the increasing complexity 
of regulatory regimes, agencies will increasingly automate their 
decisions.52 With further automation on the horizon, the inadequacy of last 
century’s procedural protections can no longer be ignored. Administrative 
law must evolve to face these changes.  
This Article offers a new framework for administrative and 
constitutional law designed to address the challenges of the automated 
administrative state. Part I describes how automated systems are built and 
the varying ways that policy is embedded, and often distorted, in software 
code. It provides a typology of the automated systems that agencies use. 
Part I then considers the recent failures of automated systems and explains 
why human operators provide little protection against such failures. 
Part II highlights how automation jeopardizes the procedural 
protections that have long been deemed foundational to the administrative 
state. It explores how computer systems collapse individual adjudications 
into rulemaking, making it difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
whether a decision resulted from factual errors, distorted policy, or both. 
Part II shows how automation erodes the due process guarantees of notice 
and an opportunity to be heard. It assesses the myriad ways automation 
strips procedural integrity from administrative rulemaking, including the 
elimination of notice-and-comment participation, transparency, and 
political accountability. Lastly, Part II highlights the difficulties involved 
in judicial review of automated rules and adjudications.  
Part III articulates a new model of technological due process. Drawing 
theoretical support from the rules-versus-standards literature, it offers a 
systematic way for an agency to approach the threshold decision of 
whether to favor automation over human discretion. This technological 
due process provides new mechanisms to replace the procedural regimes 
that automation endangers. In certain instances, surrogate rules can be 
used to protect the transparency, accountability, and fairness of 
rulemaking and adjudication. In others, new standards can be implemented 
to prevent procedurally defective rulemaking and arbitrary government 
decision making.  
 
 
 52. See Kersten, supra note 10 (noting that decision automation has become increasingly 
indispensable to government due to computers’ ability to process large volumes of information); 
Grimmelmann, supra note 29, at 1734 (explaining that software successfully applies rules whose 
complexity would confound human beings). 
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I. THE ROOTS AND NATURE OF AUTOMATED GOVERNMENT POLICY-
MAKING AND ADJUDICATION 
The automated administrative state took root after the convergence of a 
number of trends—budget shortfalls in the 1990s, the falling costs and 
increased performance of information systems, and the emergence of the 
Internet.53 Government officials saw computerized automation as an 
efficient way to reduce operating costs.54 Automated systems meant less 
paperwork and fewer staff.55  
Federal and state agencies have made significant strides in their quest 
to automate government policy and decision making. Today, computer 
systems determine whether children receive medical assistance, businesses 
obtain licenses and permits, and travelers board airplanes.56 All states 
automate a significant portion of the administration of their public benefits 
programs.57 More than fifty federal agencies execute policy with data-
matching and data-mining programs.58  
Section A details the process involved in building automated systems 
and explains why policy so often gets distorted when programmers 
translate it into code. It describes how agencies use systems that exclude 
human operators, as well as those that mix automation with human 
intervention.59 Section B considers the recent failures of automated 
 
 
 53. See EGGERS, supra note 18, at 5, 15–16 (explaining that the late 1990s witnessed productivity 
growth from IT investments and certain sections of government took advantage of its promise); Shane 
Peterson, Squeeze Play, GOV’T TECH., Jan. 6, 2004, available at http://www.govtech.net/magazine/ 
story.print.php?id=83612.  
 54. Peterson, supra note 53. 
 55. EGGERS, supra note 18, at 29. 
 56. See infra notes 111, 112, and 117 for a discussion of automated public benefits systems, 
“No-Fly” data-matching program, and grant eligibility advice systems. 
 57. U.S. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MMIS FISCAL AGENT CONTRACT 
STATUS REPORT (2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MMIS/Downloads/mmisfaqr.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S. CMS, CONTRACT STATUS REPORT]; WILLIAM BRANCH & KATHLEEN CONNOR, CMS 
AND STATE MEDICAID PROGRAMS MODERNIZATION: MEDICAID INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
ARCHITECTURE (MITA) 6 (2005), available at http://www.omg.org/news/meetings/workshops/ 
ADM_2005_Proceedings_FINAL/2-2_Branch-Connors.pdf; JACK SLOCUM ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRICULTURE, STATE AUTOMATION SYSTEMS STUDY, Vol. II, at II-12–II-16 (1995), available at 
http://www.nal.usda.gov/foodstamp/FOODSTAMPREPORTS/FSP-294.PDF (explaining that forty-
one states incorporated automated systems into administration of food stamps). 
 58. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS 
COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 2 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf; 
CRS, DATA MINING, supra note 49, at 4 (noting the use of data mining by Justice Department, 
Department of Veterans Affairs and Federal Aviation Administration, for example). 
 59. See generally Raja Parasuraman & Victor Riley, Humans and Automation: Use, Misuse, 
Disuse, Abuse, 39 HUM. FACTORS 230 (1997); see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI 05-99-00071, MEDICAID: CLAIMS PROCESSING SAFEGUARDS 10 
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systems, including the encoding of incorrect policy, faulty notices, and 
mistaken identifications. It explains why human operators in mixed 
systems fail to provide adequate protection against such problems.  
A. Government 2.0 
1. Designing Automated Decision Systems 
Automated decision systems have been characterized as rules-based 
programs, data-matching programs, or data-mining programs. First, rules-
based systems apply policy to a set of facts.60 Programmers translate 
policy from human language into computer code and embed it into the 
system’s “rules base,” which is often called the “decision tables.”61 The 
“rules engine” provides the system’s logic.62 Second, data-matching 
systems compare two or more databases with an algorithmic set of rules 
that determine the likelihood that two sets of personal identifying 
information represent the same individual.63 Third, data mining employs 
algorithms and search engines to find specific patterns and correlations in 
information stored in large databases.64 
Private vendors typically build these systems, often with the help of 
government information technology personnel.65 For example, state 
agency workers played a significant role in building Colorado’s public 
benefits system. State programmers encoded policy into the system’s 
decision tables; a private vendor, EDS, constructed the system’s rules 
 
 
(2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-99-00071.pdf [hereinafter U.S. OIG, 
MEDICAID]. 
 60. Davenport & Harris, supra note 17, at 85. 
 61. Id. The system presents a series of questions to a user until it believes it has all of the 
information required for the decision. Id. at 86. 
 62. Id. at 85. 
 63. Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2005). 
 64. Vagelis Papakonstantinou, A Data Protection Approach to Data Matching Operations 
Among Public Bodies, 9 INT’L J.L. INFO. TECH. 39, 47–48 (2001). 
 65. Ellen Perlman, How a Promising Technology Mega-Project Went Awry, GOVERNING, Aug. 
2006, at 36 (explaining that Colorado agencies took some of CBMS software development back in-
house); Andy Opsahl, Weathering the Storm, GOV’T TECH., Oct. 2, 2006, available at http://www. 
govtech.net/magazine/story.print. php?id=101349. For instance, thirty-eight states have hired 
independent contractors to build and oversee computer systems that will administer the Medicaid 
program. U.S. CMS, CONTRACT STATUS REPORT, supra note 57. Of those states, twenty have hired 
EDS. Id. EDS also designed CBMS and California’s public benefits system. Judy Lin, Computer Cost 
Put in Millions, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 13, 2005, at B1. SRA International, an information 
technology service provider, operates the Federal Parent Locator Service’s database on behalf of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. SRA INT’L INC., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2005), 
available at http://www.sra.com/uploadedFiles/sra2005_ar.pdf.  
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engine.66 Although EDS currently runs the system, state programmers 
continue to maintain the decision tables.67  
Policy is often distorted when programmers translate it into code. 
Although all translations shade meaning,68 the translation of policy from 
human language into code is more likely to result in a significant alteration 
of meaning than would the translation of policy from English into another 
human language.69 This is, in part, because the artificial languages 
intelligible to computers have a more limited vocabulary than human 
languages.70 Computer languages may be unable to capture the nuances of 
a particular policy.71  
Code writers also interpret policy when they translate it from human 
language to computer code.72 Distortions in policy have been attributed to 
the fact that programmers lack “policy knowledge.”73 This is neither 
surprising nor easily remedied. Information technology consultants cannot 
be expected to have specialized expertise in regulatory or public benefits 
programs. Finding and hiring individuals who possess both information 
systems proficiency and policy knowledge would undoubtedly be difficult 
and expensive. Many governments find it cost-effective to use the same 
system designers for a wide variety of programs,74 making it even less 
likely that a designer will have the necessary policy expertise in each 
distinct program. 
 
 
 66. The programmers worked for Colorado’s Departments of Human Services and Health Care 
Policy and Financing. Karen Augé, Blame Aplenty in Benefits Mess, DENVER POST, May 15, 2005, at 
A1. 
 67. Id. 
 68. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976); J.M. 
Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 783–86 (1987). 
 69. AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COUNCIL, AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING ISSUES PAPER 35 (2003), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/ 
agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(E671321254BE241EF50E9203E76822F1)~AAADMreportPDF.PDF 
[hereinafter AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE].  
 70. Id.; Grimmelmann, supra note 29, at 1728.  
 71. See Graham Greenleaf et al., Representing and Using Legal Knowledge in Integrated 
Decision Support Systems: DataLex Workstations, 3 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 97, 127 (1995). 
 72. AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 35. 
 73. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., TEX. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM’N, TIERS/IEES REVIEW 
29 (2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter TEXAS OIG, TIERS]; see also DELOITTE, STATE OF 
COLORADO: CBMS POST-IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW 7 (May 2005) (on file with author) (explaining 
that incorrect rules embedded in CBMS were in part due to incorrect policy interpretation by 
programmers); cf. Jessica Weidling, Housing Hopes, GOV’T TECH., June 2007, at 47, available at 
http://www.govtech.com/dc/articles/123618 (noting that in an “uncharacteristic move for the public 
sector,” Philadelphia Housing Authority administrators spent time with software provider to carefully 
discuss requirements of their automated telephone system). 
 74. Eggers, supra note 19, at 14. 
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Changes in policy made during its translation into code may also stem 
from the bias of the programmer.75 Programmers can build matching 
algorithms that have biased assumptions or limitations embedded in 
them.76 They can unconsciously phrase a question in a biased manner.77 
The biases of individual programmers can have a larger, accumulating 
effect, because, in a complex software system composed of smaller 
subsystems, the actual bias of the system “may well be a composite of 
rules specified by different programmers.”78  
Policy could be distorted by a code writer’s preference for binary 
questions, which can be easily translated into code.79 Government policy, 
however, often requires the weighing of multiple variables. For example, 
the Food Stamp Act and accompanying federal regulations limit 
unemployed, childless adults to three months of food stamps, but provide 
six exceptions to this rule, which then cross reference other exceptions 
that, in turn, refer to still other exceptions.80 Programmers may be tempted 
to write code employing a simplified three-month rule, leaving out the 
complicated and arguably confusing exceptions.81 Thus, code writers 
could end up distorting complicated policy through oversimplification.82 
Programmers might also inappropriately narrow the discretion intended to 
be given to administrators.83  
Programmers are not the only individuals to blame for distorted policy. 
Bureaucrats themselves might be responsible for altered rules. Professor 
 
 
 75. Code embeds the values and choices of the code writer. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 
2.0 101 (2006).  
 76. Steinbock, supra note 63, at 60–61; see Grimmelmann, supra note 29, at 1733 (explaining 
that a software rule can be partisan as it implements programmer’s idea of right result). 
 77. See Helen Nissenbaum, How Computer Systems Embody Values, COMPUTER, Mar. 2001, at 
119 (noting that systems can unfairly discriminate against specific sectors of users). Batya Friedman 
and Helen Nissenbaum have written about automated systems whose algorithms embody bias. Batya 
Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. 
SYSTEMS 330, 333–35 (1996) (describing automated loan program whose system assigns negative 
value to applicants from certain locations, such as high-crime or low-income neighborhoods). Their 
study, however, does not reveal whether the bias originated from the programmer’s bias or that of a 
policymaker.  
 78. Grimmelmann, supra note 29, at 1737.  
 79. Cf. AUSTRALIAN GOV’T AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING, 
at 37 (Feb. 2007) (on file with author) (explaining that automated system must reflect the structural 
complexity of rules and accurately reflect all of the relevant factors such that the embedded business 
rules do not incorrectly “restrict or fetter the powers provided for under legislation or policy”).  
 80. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o) (2000); 7 C.F.R. § 273.25 (2007).  
 81. See Super, supra note 30, at 1096 n.205 (discussing potential for eligibility workers and those 
designing notices to read three-month rule with regard to childless adults seeking food stamps without 
regard to the exceptions). 
 82. AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 18–20. 
 83. Id. at 21. 
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Evelyn Brodkin has studied frontline bureaucratic routines that create new 
policy at the point of delivery.84 Lower-level bureaucrats may make policy 
when established policy is ambiguous or internally contradictory.85 Such 
practices produce “street-level” welfare policies that have not received 
rulemaking procedures.86 Decision systems might automate such policies.  
2. Different Types of Automated Systems Used by Agencies  
Automated systems involve individuals in the administrative decision-
making process in varying ways. Fully automated systems apply policy 
and render decisions without any human intervention.87 For instance, 
computer programs identify students eligible for free or reduced-price 
school lunches by matching the names of enrolled students with the names 
of families receiving certain public benefits.88 This data-matching program 
automatically registers identified children into the National School Lunch 
Program.89 Computers can automatically enroll eligible senior citizens into 
Medicare coverage of outpatient care and prescription drug discount 
cards.90 Human operators cannot interfere with the system’s enrollment 
decisions.91  
An agency’s telephone system is an example of a fully automated 
system. A telephone tree presents choices to a user, closing off paths that 
the system’s designers deemed irrelevant. This preclusion of choices 
constitutes an automated decision.92 For example, for a period of two 
 
 
 84. Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Street-Level Research: Policy at the Front Lines, in POLICY INTO 
ACTION: IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH AND WELFARE REFORM 145 (Mary Clare Lennon & Thomas 
Corbett eds., 2003). 
 85. Id. at 149. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Parasuraman & Riley, supra note 59, at 247. Although human operators can have little 
impact on a completely automated system’s decision, the system’s designers play an enormous role in 
creating that system. Id. 
 88. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, DATA MATCHING IN THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH 
PROGRAM 13 (2007), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/MENU/Published/CNP/FILES/ 
DataMatchingGuide.pdf. 
 89. Id. 
 90. STAN DORN & GENEVIEVE M. KENNEY, AUTOMATICALLY ENROLLING ELIGIBLE CHILDREN 
AND FAMILIES INTO MEDICAID AND SCHIP: OPPORTUNITIES, OBSTACLES, AND OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL 
POLICYMAKERS 5 (2006), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Dorn_auto-
enrollingchildren_931.pdf?section=4039.  
 91. Id. 
 92. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 707–08 (2003) (noting that code can 
constrain behavior by specifying what behavior is or is not possible just as a “brick wall in the middle 
of the road modifies behavior”); see also Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of 
Social Norms, in CYBERCRIME: DIGITAL COPS IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT 37, 43 (Jack M. 
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years, the CBMS website instructed individuals to call a toll-free number 
if they needed emergency assistance with their public benefits.93 Callers 
reached a telephone system that provided nine choices for individuals 
seeking customer service.94 None of these choices offered assistance with 
food stamps or Medicaid.95 One could argue that the automated telephone 
system, by its design, determined that emergency help was unavailable to 
those receiving food stamps and Medicaid.96  
Similarly, Florida residents seeking public assistance must submit 
online applications to ACCESS, the state’s automated benefits system.97 
These online applications require individuals to choose their status from a 
limited menu of options.98 In 2005, that menu did not include an option for 
a relative seeking benefits on a child’s behalf.99 The mandatory nature of 
the online system effectively precluded such relative caregivers from 
applying for public benefits, a denial that directly contravened state law.100 
Eligibility workers were unable to overrule this decision, implicit in the 
code of the automated system, because the ACCESS system was the only 
way an individual could apply for benefits.101 
Mixed systems, by contrast, provide a role for human operators in the 
execution of policy. There are three distinct types of mixed systems. The 
 
 
Balkin et al. eds., 2007) (explaining that architectural choices of code writers exploit asymmetries of 
information because individuals do not know that the architect has constrained their actions). 
 93. REPORT OF THE COLO. STATE AUDITOR, ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATIONS FOR FEDERAL 
BENEFIT PROGRAMS: PERFORMANCE AUDIT 10–11 (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.leg.state.co. 
us/OSA/coauditor1.nsf/All/DE8F7D03359F1A0B87257154005DE9DA/$FILE/1735%20CBMS
%20Elig%20Deter%20Fed%20Ben%20Perf%20April%202006.pdf [hereinafter COLO. AUDITOR, 
PERFORMANCE AUDIT]. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Federal law requires the provision of emergency help to individuals seeking or receiving food 
stamps. 7 C.F.R. 273.2(i) (2007). 
 97. Petition to Determine Invalidity of Proposed Rule 65A-1.400 and ESS Online Benefits 
Application Form at 6, Tamara Clark v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., No. 05-2105RP (Fla. Div. 
Adm. Hrgs. June 10, 2005) [hereinafter Clark Petition] (arguing that relative caregivers could not 
apply for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families due to the design of the online application in 
violation of Florida law). Florida’s Department of Children and Family Services settled the litigation, 
agreeing to fix the system to allow relative caregivers to apply for benefits on behalf of children as 
required by federal law. Telephone Interview with Valory Greenfield, staff attorney for Florida Legal 
Services, in Miami, Fla. (June 1, 2007) (notes on file with author). New York’s automated public 
benefits system similarly failed to offer “battered qualifying alien” as a choice in its drop-down menu 
for food stamp eligibility, thus precluding such individuals from applying for food stamps. M.K.B. v. 
Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting preliminary injunction ordering New 
York City agencies to fix automated system to comply with established policy).  
 98. Clark Petition, supra note 97, at 6. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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first type uses automation to generate an agency’s decisions, but permits 
appeals from those decisions. For instance, a data matching program 
known as the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) compares federal and 
state databases to identify parents who owe child support.102 The system 
notifies relevant state enforcement agencies of matches.103 Federal law 
requires state agencies to take expedited action to collect child support 
from those individuals.104 Individuals who have been mistakenly identified 
as delinquent parents can appeal to state officials to remove child-support 
orders issued against them.105 
Another example of this first type of mixed system are the public 
benefits systems that deny certain claims made by Medicaid providers 
without initially seeking a human operator’s review, but allow for later 
human review.106 For example, when a medical provider seeks payment 
for twelve services, but state policy generally only permits coverage for 
ten, the system automatically pays the provider for ten services without 
determining whether exceptional circumstances apply that would permit 
coverage of all twelve.107 Medical providers can ask for administrative 
review of those decisions.  
The second type of mixed system integrates human operators into the 
initial decision-making process. For example, Florida’s ACCESS system 
requires eligibility workers to determine whether individuals suffer from a 
“hardship” that would warrant extending their cash assistance payments 
beyond the state’s time limits.108 Eligibility workers conduct telephone 
interviews with applicants to determine whether an individual’s 
circumstances constitute a “hardship” within the meaning of the state’s 
rules.109 The worker then inputs that decision into the ACCESS 
 
 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 653 (2000). The Federal Parent Locator Service matches state databases of child-
support orders against a national database of new employees. Id.; see Kansas v. United States, 214 
F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000) (describing FPLS).  
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). 
 104. Id.; see also David E. Danda, Child Support Enforcement Under the Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act, FINDLAW, May 2000, http://library.findlaw.com/2000/May/1/128527.html.  
 105. E.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-517 (2007) (explaining that child-support obligor may 
request an administrative review to contest whether individual owes child support). 
 106. U.S. OIG, MEDICAID, supra note 59, at 10.  
 107. Id. at 10–11. 
 108. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Lang, Director of ACCESS Florida, in Miami, Fla. (June 
8, 2007) (notes on file with author). In California, eligibility workers determine whether Medicaid 
applicants have a qualifying disability. Telephone Interview with Melissa Rodgers, Directing 
Attorney, Legal Aid Society of San Mateo County, in San Mateo, Cal. (June 4, 2007) (notes on file 
with author). 
 109. Interview with Jennifer Lang, supra note 108.  
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program.110 Similarly, automated public benefits systems in Colorado, 
Texas, California, and Florida produce recommended eligibility 
determinations and benefit calculations, which are then reviewed by 
eligibility workers who issue the final decisions.111  
The “No Fly” program is another example of a mixed system that 
allows human operators to exercise discretion as part of the decision-
making process. In that program, a matching algorithm compares the 
names of air travelers with names listed in the “No Fly” database.112 When 
the computer system generates a match, an airline employee or federal 
official is given discretion to determine whether or not the name should be 
forwarded to the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).113 When the TSC 
receives information about a match, its officials use their discretion to 
assess whether the individual poses a terrorist threat.114 People who endure 
extensive questioning and miss flights as a result of this program can file 
redress claims with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).115  
The third type of mixed system generates automated advice for citizens 
and entities, who may then use the advice to make further decisions. Many 
states employ online portals where citizens can complete a survey to 
 
 
 110. Id. In CBMS, eligibility workers also exercise their judgment on certain issues before the 
system determines eligibility and calculates an individual’s benefits. Telephone Interview with Nancy 
Morehead, Public Relations Administrator for Colorado Department of Human Services, April 16, 
2007 (notes on file with author). See Ross Wehner et al., Blame Game in Benefits Woes, DENVER 
POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at B1 (explaining that “caseworkers in 64 counties determine which of the six 
benefits programs a person qualifies for” and with a touch of a key the system notifies the bank to send 
a check). 
 111. Interview with Jennifer Lang, supra note 108; Interview with Melissa Rodgers, supra note 
108; Terry Sapp, Ventura County Combines Automation and Collaboration, POL’Y & PRAC., June 1, 
2006, at 40; Cynthia V. Fukami & Donald J. McCubbrey, Colorado Benefits Management System (B): 
The Emperor’s New System, 18 COMM. OF ASS’N FOR INFO. SYSTEMS 488 (2006); COLO. AUDITOR, 
PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 93, at 21; Reeves, supra note 17.  
 112. U.S. GAO, TERRORIST WATCH LIST, supra note 12, at 7–8. Customs and Border Protection 
officers screen travelers entering the United States while the Transportation Security Administration 
prescreens air travelers flying from and throughout the United States. Id.  
 113. Id. at 9. 
 114. Id. at 9–11. In November 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acknowledged 
the existence of the Automated Targeting System (ATS), a computer program that generates a terror-
risk score for international travelers. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOMATED TARGETING SYSTEM, Nov. 22, 2006, available at http://www.dhs. 
gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_cbp_ats.pdf. The computerized system assesses whether 
individuals traveling abroad pose a terrorist threat. Michael J. Sniffen, Keeping Tabs on Travelers, 
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 10, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 17986706. The Department of 
Homeland Security will keep the risk assessment for 15 years. Id. Nevertheless, travelers cannot see 
their actual assessments or the reasons for them. Id. Customs and Border Protection officials use the 
system to screen 400 million passengers a year. Id. 
 115. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security Website, Step 1: Should I use DHS TRIP?, Feb. 21, 2007, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/programs/gc_1169699418061.shtm [hereinafter DHS TRIP]. 
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determine which public services they may be eligible to receive.116 Other 
systems advise individuals and entities on the likelihood that the 
government will approve their grant requests.117 In these examples, 
automated systems provide advice to citizens, but do not render final 
decisions on behalf of agencies. 
The next section provides examples of recent failures of today’s 
automated decision-making systems and explores how regardless of 
whether the system is fully automated or mixed, the problems are the 
same.  
B. Failure of Government 2.0  
Federal and state agencies began using computer systems to assist 
human decision makers in the 1970s.118 Problems plagued these systems 
from the outset. Computers storing welfare benefits information routinely 
crashed.119 Glitches in computer programs delayed the delivery of 
Medicaid benefits and food stamps.120 Inaccurate information in databases 
resulted in the overpayment and underpayment of public benefits.121  
Undeterred by these initial problems, agencies today increasingly use 
computer systems to make decisions. The recent failures of these systems 
have had wide-sweeping consequences.122 Hundreds of thousands of 
individuals have lost public benefits, missed airplanes, and faced 
erroneous child support delinquency charges.  
 
 
 116. Harris & Dovey, supra note 16, at 153. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Don Bacon, Mess in Welfare: The Inside Story, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 20, 1978, at 
21. 
 119. E.g., David K. Rogers et al., Computer Delays Welfare Services, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
June 3, 1992, at A1 (explaining that computer system maintaining Florida’s public benefits services 
crashed, hobbling state’s ability to distribute food stamps, Medicaid, and other public benefits). 
 120. E.g., Steven Erlanger, Computers Continue to Delay Welfare Payments in New York, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 1987, § 1, at 25; Jean Dietz, A Glitch in State Medicaid System, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 
19, 1984, available at 1984 WLNR 63032.  
 121. Associated Press, Computer Error Hits Human Services, N.J. RECORD, Aug. 2, 1997, at A9. 
 122. CELIA HAGERT, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY PRIORITIES, 
TESTIMONY ON THE INTEGRATED ELIGIBILITY SYSTEM 33 (2007), http://www.cppp.org/files/ 
3/House%20HHS%202_07.ppt [hereinafter Hagert Testimony] (testimony before the Texas House 
Human Services Committee, 80th Legislature, Session 33) (describing 6.82% food stamps error rate in 
Texas vis-à-vis 2.96% error rate in Pennsylvania since TIERS went live). Failures of Texas’s TIERS 
system also caused children’s Medicaid enrollment to drop 29,000 individuals and the Children’s 
Healthcare Initiative Program renewal rate to fall from 84% to 52%. CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
PRIORITIES, PUB. NO. 267, ROCKY ROAD FOR CHILDREN’S HEALTH CARE 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.cppp.org/files/3/IEE% 20Impact%20on%20child%20Medicaid%20and%20CHIP.pdf. See 
generally HENRY PETROSKI, SUCCESS THROUGH FAILURE: THE PARADOX OF DESIGN (2006) 
(explaining that a system fails when it does not meet its stated goals).  
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Some of these problems can be attributed to programmers’ failure to 
properly translate policy into code. These failures inadvertently altered 
established policy and consequently violated federal and state law. For 
example, from September 2004 to April 2007, code writers embedded 
over nine hundred incorrect rules into Colorado’s public benefits 
system.123 With one such incorrect rule, CBMS denied Medicaid to 
patients with breast and cervical cancer based on income and asset limits 
that were not authorized by federal or state law.124 Another rule led CBMS 
to exclude a child’s relatives from Medicaid benefits on the legally 
baseless grounds that the child received Medicaid.125 Yet another caused 
CBMS to deny pregnant women Medicaid in contravention of federal 
law.126  
CBMS’s problems were not limited to Medicaid. CBMS incorporated 
an incorrect rule that discontinued food stamps to individuals with past 
drug problems in violation of Colorado law.127 Incorrect rules also caused 
the system to fail to offer food stamps to individuals with “permanent 
disabilities”128 and to incorrectly refuse to recognize phone bills as a valid 
expense for households seeking food stamps.129 Contrary to federal law, 
 
 
 123. See COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES (2004–
2007) (on file with author); DELOITTE, supra note 73 (explaining that there were 175 distinct defects in 
the Medicaid rules table in 2005). For other incorrect rules encoded in the system, see, for example, 
COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, FEBRUARY 24–25, 
2007, at 19 (Feb. 26, 2007) (issuing correction of code that exempted a child’s earnings in calculating 
food stamps where the child was the head of the household in contravention of federal regulations); 
COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES (FOOD STAMPS), 
AUGUST 12–13, 2006, at 10 (Aug. 11, 2006) (correcting embedded rule that did not allow Medicare 
premium as an expense for disabled individual in contravention of federal regulations). 
 124. COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, MARCH 
10–11, 2007, at 10 (Mar. 7, 2007) (fixing rule that improperly imposed income limits on women with 
breast or cervical cancer in violation of federal law); see 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-1b (2000); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 25.5-5-308) (2007).  
 125. COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, 
DECEMBER 9–10, 2006, at 16 (Dec. 7, 2006) (fixing code that violated 42 C.F.R. § 435.119). 
 126. COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, 
FEBRUARY 12, 2005, at 1 (Feb. 12, 2005) (fixing code that deemed pregnant women ineligible for 
Medicaid due to fact that they were “not in an approved facility,” contrary to 42 C.F.R. § 435.116). 
 127. COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, 
FEBRUARY 3–4, 2007, at 24 (Feb. 1, 2007) (correcting rule embedded in system that contravened 
COLO. STAT. § 26-2-305, which mandates that individuals “shall not be ineligible [for food stamps] 
due to a drug conviction unless misuse of food stamp benefits is part of the court findings”).  
 128. COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, 
FEBRUARY 25, 2005, at 10 (Feb. 25, 2005) (noting fix to code that had contravened 7 C.F.R. § 273.9 
by refusing to grant food stamps to individuals with a “Permanent Disability”). 
 129. COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, APRIL 30, 
2005, at 10 (Apr. 30, 2005) (fixing rule that contravened 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(d)(7), which makes 
telephone charges a deductible expense); e.g., COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, 
DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, SEPTEMBER 8, 2005, at 2 (Sept. 8, 2005) (making a change so that 
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CBMS provided food stamps to college students who did not work the 
required twenty hours a week.130  
CBMS rendered hundreds of thousands of erroneous eligibility 
decisions and benefits calculations during this period.131 The enormity of 
the system’s failure, and the litigation that followed, forced state agency 
officials to spend significant resources to find and fix the system’s 
defective rules.132 Despite significant pressure to resolve these problems 
quickly, computer programmers delayed fixing incorrect rules for 
extended periods of time.133 During that period eligibility workers had to 
use fictitious data to work around the system’s errors.134  
 
 
“child support-not court ordered” would not be allowed as an expense as required by 7 C.F.R. 
§ 253.7).  
 130. COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, JULY 22, 
2005, at 2 (July 23, 2005) (fixing rule contravening 7 U.S.C. § 2015(e) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.5, which 
excluded students not working over twenty hours per week from eligibility for food stamps); see 
generally David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in 
the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1358 (2004) (discussing changes to Food 
Stamp program).  
 131. David Migoya, Feds Give Colorado a Big Bill, DENVER POST, Apr. 12, 2007, at B1 
(explaining that CBMS made up to 11,000 errors per month). 
 132. Fukami & McCubbrey, supra note 111, at 491–92; Bill Scanlon, Millions Spent on Welfare 
Fix: A Year Later, State Benefits System Still Fighting Kinks, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 3, 2005, at 
6A; COLO. AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 93, at 22 (explaining that seventy-two percent 
of sample food stamp applications and forty-one percent of a sample of Medicaid cases had at least 
one error). The federal government sued Colorado for CBMS’s overpayment of over ten million 
dollars of food stamps. Letter from Dennis Kaplan, Chairman, State Food Stamp Appeals Board, to 
Wade S. Livingston, First Assistant Attorney General, Human Services Section (Apr. 5, 2007) (on file 
with author) (decision of the Colorado Food Stamp Appeals Board, Administrative review No. 02-
2006, amending decision of the Food and Nutrition Services against Colorado for improper issuance of 
duplicate or restored Food Stamps benefits from $11,162,598 to $10,864,345 owed federal 
government). The Colorado Center on Law and Policy filed a class-action lawsuit against the Colorado 
Department of Health and Human Services on behalf of Colorado residents whose public-benefits 
applications were delayed, incorrectly reduced or terminated, or who received insufficient notice. 
Fourth Amended Complaint, Davis v. Tool, No. 04-CV-7059 (Denver D. Ct. May 25, 2006). That 
litigation is ongoing. Telephone Interview with Ed Kahn, Counsel, Center on Policy Priorities, in 
Denver, Colo. (Apr. 10, 2007) (notes on file with author). 
 133. Fukami & McCubbrey, supra note 111, at 493. E.g. COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, MARCH 10–11, 2007, supra note 124, at 10 (Mar. 7, 2007) 
(fixing rule that improperly imposed income limits on women with breast or cervical cancer in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. §1396r-1b, COLO. STAT. § 25.5-5-308). Despite newspaper accounts of this 
illicit policy, Colorado administrators delayed fixing it for years. Karen Augé, Computer Benefits 
System Ticks off Cancer Survivor, DENVER POST, May 16, 2005, at A1 (explaining that CBMS failed 
to recognize that women with breast or cervical could retain Medicaid despite an increase in their cost 
of living); COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, MARCH 
10–11, 2007, supra note 124, at 10 (Mar. 7, 2007) (CMBS took two years to fix the problem). 
 134. Interview with Nancy Morehead, supra note 110 (explaining that workers used fake data to 
work around the system); Fukami & McCubbrey, supra note 111, at 493 (noting that officials have 
published 5,943 pages of workarounds). Although CBMS exemplifies a worst-case scenario, this level 
of policy distortion could be replicated in another case. Distortions in policy changes in systems with 
less dramatic or obvious results would be more likely to remain hidden. This may even be more 
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Code writers incorrectly translated policy into California’s automated 
public benefits system known as CalWIN, causing overpayments, 
underpayments, and improper terminations of public benefits.135 For 
instance, CalWIN denied Medicaid to foster children in contravention of 
federal law.136 According to a class action filed in April 2007, CalWIN 
canceled Medicaid for over five thousand “Qualified Medicare 
Beneficiaries” because they failed to obtain annual redeterminations.137 
Neither federal nor state law requires annual redeterminations for such 
individuals.138 There, an incorrectly coded rule had disastrous results.139 
Texas’s automated public benefits system, known as Texas Integrated 
Eligibility Redesign System (TIERS),140 also altered established policy.141 
For example, TIERS granted benefits to individuals whose Social Security 
number, citizenship, or residency had not been verified in violation of 
federal and state policy.142 A 2007 audit found that TIERS made incorrect 
 
 
dangerous than catastrophes such as CBMS because, in such cases, illegal rules would not necessarily 
be caught and fixed.  
 135. See Pamela Martineau, With Lessons Learned, Yolo Launches CalWIN Program, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 3, 2005, at B1 (noting that CalWIN’s programming errors caused 
overpayments or delays in payment of public benefits in Placer and Sacramento counties); Evelyn 
Larrubia & Caitlin Liu, County’s Computer System is Botching Medical Benefits Aid, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
17, 2002, at H1 (explaining that computer errors resulted in denial of prenatal care). 
 136. Clea Benson, Foster Child’s Benefits Denied, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 11, 2005, at B1. 
 137. Computer Glitch Drops Some Medicare Patients in 18 California Counties, INSIDE CMS, 
Mar. 8, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4384599. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Interview with Melissa Rodgers, supra note 108 (explaining that thousands of elderly 
California citizens could not pick up prescriptions or receive care due to software flaws). 
 140. TEXAS OIG, TIERS, supra note 73, at 6. TIERS currently administers enrollment for CHIP, 
Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families in two Texas counties. Id. at 3.  
 141. TEXAS OIG, TIERS, supra note 73. Florida’s automated system ACCESS also promulgated 
incorrect rules. For instance, Florida law permits caretaker relatives to apply for TANF benefits on a 
child’s behalf. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 20.506(1) (West Supp. 2007) (creating Welfare Transaction Trust 
Fund for purposes of receiving funds under TANF); 414.0252(5),(12) (WEST 2005) (defining family 
eligible for TANF as including caretaker relatives who live in same house as child, who has assumed 
responsibility for the child, and who is related to the child by blood or marriage). Contrary to state law, 
ACCESS did not allow relative caregivers to apply for TANF funds for children. See Clark Petition, 
supra note 97, at 2 (“Although the online Application Form purports to allow applicants to make a 
uniform application for public assistance, the URL Application Form does not allow applicants to 
apply for either child-only Welfare Transition or Relative Caregiver benefits.”). 
 142. TEXAS OIG, TIERS, supra note 73, at App. 2, 126–27, available at https://oig.hhsc.state.tx. 
us/Reports/1-Appendices/Appendix2.pdf (explaining that TIERS granted Medicaid, food stamps, and 
TANF benefits without verifying Social Security numbers in violation of 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(g), 7 
C.F.R. § 273.2(f)(1)(v), and state policy). In March 2007, the Texas Department of Human Services 
ended its contract with the Texas Access Alliance, a private consortium headed by Accenture that 
designed and operated TIERS. TEXAS HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES COMM’N, TIERS/IEES REVIEW, 
Apr. 18, 2007, at 1, 37 (on file with author) [hereinafter TIERS/IEES REVIEW] (explaining that Texas 
suspended pilot of TIERS and ended contract with Accenture). In March 2007, the federal Food & 
Nutrition Service reprimanded the Texas Health & Human Services Commission (THHSC) for 
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eligibility determinations for food stamp applicants in four out of six test 
cases.143 On May 25, 2007, the Texas legislature passed a bill to demand 
that TIERS comply with applicable federal law and regulations.144  
The mixed systems of CBMS, CalWIN, and TIERS rendered vast 
numbers of incorrect decisions despite the fact that eligibility workers 
reviewed and finalized the computer’s decisions.145 These failures of 
mixed systems strongly suggest that the practical distinction between fully 
automated systems and mixed ones should not be overstated. Eligibility 
workers’ intuitive trust in computer systems tends to reduce the value of 
human participation in mixed systems.146 The cognitive system’s 
engineering literature has found that human beings view automated 
systems as error-resistant.147 Operators of automated systems tend to trust 
a computer’s answers.148 
As a result, operators of government decision systems are less likely to 
search for information that would contradict a computer-generated 
solution.149 Studies show that human beings rely on automated decisions 
even when they suspect system malfunction.150 The impulse to follow a 
computer’s recommendation flows from human “automation bias”—the 
“use of automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information 
 
 
moving ahead with the rollout of TIERS despite its problematic software. Dave Mann, Trail of TIERS, 
TEXAS OBSERVER, Apr. 20, 2007, at 12. That month, THHSC terminated its contract with Accenture 
and delayed its roll out of TIERS. Stephanie Goodman, HHSC, Texas Access Alliance Agree to End 
Contract Early (Mar. 13, 2007), http://www.hhs.state.tx.us/news/release/031307_AccessAlliance. 
shtml.  
 143. TIERS/IEES REVIEW, supra note 142, at 3. 
 144. H.B. 3575, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007) (passed by House on May 11, 2007 and Senate 
on May 25, 2007, signed by Governor on June 15, 2007); 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 1110. 
 145. See Clark Petition, supra note 97 (describing how eligibility workers in mixed systems such 
as CBMS, TIERS, CalWIN, and ACCESS reviewed and finalized program’s decisions). 
 146. Kersten, supra note 10, at 38 (explaining that people tend to rely on and trust “less-than-
perfect systems”—a kind of laziness that means people do not check information and computer 
findings). 
 147. M.L. Cummings, The Social and Ethical Impact of Decision Support Interface Design, in 
INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ERGONOMICS AND HUMAN FACTORS (Waldemar Karwowski ed., 2d ed. 
2006); Thomas B. Sheridan, Speculations on Future Relations Between Humans and Automation, in 
AUTOMATION AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 449, 458 (Raja Parasuraman 
& Mustapha Mouloua eds., 1996) (“It is so tempting to trust to the magic of computers and automation 
. . . if a computer program compiles, we often believe, the software is valid and the intention will be 
achieved.”). 
 148. Prof. John McMillan, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Automated Assistance to Administrative 
Decision-Making: Launch of the Better Practice Guide, Remarks at the Institute of Public 
Administration of Australia (Apr. 23, 2007), available at http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/common 
wealth/publish.nsf/Content/speeches_2007_01.  
 149. Cummings, supra note 147, at 5. 
 150. Raja Parasuraman & Christopher A. Miller, Trust and Etiquette in High-Criticality 
Automated Systems, 47 COMM. OF THE ACM 51, 52 (Apr. 2004). 
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seeking and processing.”151 Automation bias effectively turns a computer 
program’s suggested answer into a trusted final decision.152  
Under the influence of automation bias, workers will likely adopt a 
computer’s suggested eligibility determinations and benefit calculations.153 
Members of the public, desiring public benefits but lacking sophisticated 
knowledge of federal and state rules, would rely upon an agency’s 
automated recommendations about their likely ineligibility. In this respect, 
little meaningful difference exists between a mixed system and its fully 
automated counterpart. 
Automation bias may become increasingly acute in the twenty-first 
century as our regulatory rules become increasingly intricate. As a general 
matter, those who view themselves simply as data processors will lose 
their motivation to learn the rules applied by computers.154 This may be 
especially true where human operators believe that an automated system is 
better equipped than they are to master a wide swath of complicated rules. 
Over time, human operators may lose the skills that would allow them to 
check a computer’s recommendations. As the public’s demand for 
government services grows, and as policy becomes more complicated, 
human operators may be increasingly forced to trust automated systems.155 
The distinction between mixed and fully automated systems has the 
potential to disappear as the twenty-first century progresses.156  
Agencies also fail to test automated public benefits systems in a way 
that would ensure that the embedded rules accurately reflect policy.157 For 
instance, programmers at EDS failed to test CBMS for mistakes in the 
embedded policy.158 According to a 2005 auditor’s report, EDS did not 
 
 
 151. Linda J. Skitka et al., Automation Bias and Errors: Are Crews Better Than Individuals?, 10 
INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY 85, 86 (2000). 
 152. Cummings, supra note 147, at 7. 
 153. See id. (noting that where automated system gives advice to human operator, that advice 
turns into a de facto decision due to human tendency to trust automated systems). 
 154. AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 29; Sheridan, supra note 147, 
at 459 (“[S]ophisticated automation technology will alienate workers—where alienation means losing 
their identity as skilled manual craftspeople to become button pushers, understanding less and less of 
how the technology works as it becomes more sophisticated and requires white-coated high priests to 
program it . . . blissfully trusting the technology and abandoning responsibility for one’s own 
actions.”). 
 155. Kersten, supra note 10. 
 156. This may not be true in instances where computer programs do not suggest answers or 
recommendations to human operators. But even those systems may provide misleading cues to 
operators based on the system’s design or the questions asked operators.  
 157. Texas’s independent contractor also inadequately tested TIERS. Hagert Testimony, supra 
note 122, at 14. 
 158. OFFICE OF CBMS, CO. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE POLICY & FINANCING & DEP’T OF HUMAN 
SERVS., REPORT ON CONTROLS PLACED IN OPERATION AND TESTS OF OPERATING EFFECTIVENESS 
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perform risk assessments for “regulatory compliance, legal compliance, 
technical reliability, or information integrity.”159 After only twenty days of 
piloting the program in a few counties, Colorado rolled out CBMS across 
the state.160  
Agencies routinely delay the implementation of new federal and state 
law into automated systems.161 For instance, CBMS programmers 
belatedly incorporated changes to cost-of-living adjustments into the 
system.162 During the period between the adoption of a rule change and the 
programmer’s correction of the rule, automated systems will render 
inaccurate decisions.163  
Automated systems misidentify individuals.164 The FPLS has 
incorrectly classified individuals as dead-beat parents because they share 
the same or similar names as individuals properly designated as dead-
beats.165 These erroneously labeled individuals must undergo lengthy 
proceedings to prove their innocence.166 For example, the FPLS identified 
the wrong man in a case involving a $206,000 child-support debt.167 It 
took the accused man and his attorney over two months to convince the 
California district attorney’s office that the system had made a mistake.168 
The difficulties individuals must endure to clear their names may be the 
result of an agency worker’s intuition that the computer system is 
infallible.  
 
 
(2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter COLO. HEALTH CARE, REPORT ON CONTROLS]; see DELOITTE, 
supra note 73, at 7 (urging EDS to conduct comprehensive regression testing on CBMS to check rules 
already encoded in system for accuracy and to test modifications made to rules). 
 159. Glen Emerson Morris, Lessons from the Colorado Benefits Management System Disaster, 
ADVERTISING & MARKETING REVIEW, Oct. 2004, available at http://www.ad-mkt-review.com/ 
public_html/air/ai200411.html; see COLO. HEALTH CARE, REPORT ON CONTROLS, supra note 158, at 
4–5 (noting that CBMS was not programmed to automatically provide accessible case histories for 
recipients, trace eligibility determinations, or to verify applicants’ income); James Bieman, Editorial, 
Is Anyone Listening?, 13 SOFTWARE QUALITY J. 225, 225 (2005) (explaining that CBMS disaster could 
have been prevented if proper software assurance practices had been applied). 
 160. Opsahl, supra note 65. 
 161. Kersten, supra note 10 (explaining that federal agencies such as Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services and Social Security Administration have difficulty updating rules embedded in 
automated systems in a timely manner); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, STATE AUTOMATION SYSTEMS 
STUDY: VOL. II, at VI-6 (1995).  
 162. Perlman, supra note 65. 
 163. AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 45. 
 164. U.S. GAO, TERRORIST WATCH LIST, supra note 12, at 4 (discussing misidentifications in 
airline security context). 
 165. Garvey, supra note 50. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.; Nancy Lloyd Barrett, Editorial, Paternity, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Aug. 25, 
2002, at D3 (arguing that many “dead beat dads” are being arrested for children who are not theirs). 
 168. Garvey, supra note 50. 
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The “No Fly” computer matching system routinely targets innocent 
individuals as terrorists.169 Over half of the tens of thousands of matches 
sent to TSC between 2003 and January 2006 were misidentifications.170 
These mistakes stem from faulty information stored in “No Fly” databases 
and from unsophisticated matching algorithms that fail to “distinguish 
between similar names.”171 Airline and TSC officials reviewing the 
computer’s identification of a “No Fly” match might be more inclined to 
endorse the computer’s decision due to the influence of automation bias.  
Individuals who are mistakenly included on watch lists or who are 
misidentified as someone on these lists “face consequences ranging from 
inconvenience and delay to loss of liberty.”172 The automated “No Fly” 
system works to exclude numerous innocent individuals from air travel.173 
For example, since 2005, the “No Fly” system has prevented two U.S. 
senators, a State Department diplomat, a Continental Airlines crew 
member, and a four-year-old boy from boarding their scheduled flights.174 
An American Airlines pilot, testifying before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, explained that he was detained approximately eighty times in 
 
 
 169. U.S. GAO, TERRORIST WATCH LIST, supra note 12, at 4. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Eric Lipton, U.S. Official Admits to Big Delay in Revamping No-Fly Program, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 21, 2007, at A17. 
 172. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY OFFICE REPORT ON EFFECTS ON PRIVACY & 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 7 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_rpt_nofly. 
pdf. 
 173. Gordon, supra note 42 (according to TSA spokeswoman, “an average of 1,500 airline 
travelers applied each week for redress on the grounds that they’d been mistakenly included on 
terrorist watch lists” and were denied the right to fly).  
 174. Singel, supra note 42 (quoting State Department diplomat and Continental Airlines flight-
crew member held up at airports); 60 Minutes: Unlikely Terrorists on No Fly List (CBS television 
broadcast Oct. 8, 2006) [hereinafter 60 Minutes], available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/ 
10/05/60minutes/main2066624.shtml (interviewing twelve innocent travelers who all share the same 
name as someone on the “No Fly” list and who have faced interrogations every time they fly); Local 
Nightly News: Boy, 4, has Name Show Up on TSA Watch List (ABC television broadcast Dec. 31, 
2005), available at http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=local&id=3771743 (reporting that a 
commercial airline refused to allow a four-year-old child to travel based on “No Fly” 
recommendation); Marc Rotenberg, Executive director, Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record, Hearing on “The Future of Registered Traveler” 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the H. 
Comm. on Homeland Security (Nov. 3, 2005), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/ 
rt_test_110305.pdf) [hereinafter Rotenberg Testimony] (explaining that Senators Ted Kennedy and 
Don Young were both improperly placed on watch lists). Cf. Ian McEwan Will Now Take Your 
Questions, TIME, June 18, 2007, at 6 (explaining that award-winning British novelist was detained for 
twenty-four hours by U.S. immigration officials). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/2
p 1249 Citron book pages.doc5/30/2008 1:51:00 PM  
 
 
 
 
 
2008] TECHNOLOGICAL DUE PROCESS 1275 
 
 
 
 
a single year.175 Individuals mistakenly identified as terrorists face 
intensive questioning that can last for several hours.176  
Individuals have no way of knowing if they are in the “No Fly” 
database.177 As the Department of Homeland Security’s website explains, 
the United States government will not reveal whether a particular person is 
on the terrorist watch list so as to prevent those on the list from 
circumventing the system.178 The only information the agency will release 
to aggrieved individuals is information they themselves have provided in 
their redress applications as well as TSC’s decision resolving their 
claims.179 At present, there is no assured way to get removed from the “No 
Fly” list.180 An Army major has been “pulled aside and interrogated” over 
fifteen different times despite having repeatedly filed redress claims with 
the TSA.181  
Automated systems routinely send faulty notices. For example, CBMS 
sent denial notices for cases that, in fact, were pending verification.182 
 
 
 175. Gordon, supra note 42. 
 176. U.S. GAO, TERRORIST WATCH LIST, supra note 12, at 16 (recounting interviews with 
Customs and Border Protection officers who noted that individuals can spend several hours in 
secondary screening). 
 177. DHS TRIP, supra note 115; Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond the “War” on 
Terrorism: Towards the New Intelligence Network, in EVOLVING LAWS AND PRACTICES IN A 
SECURITY-DRIVEN WORLD 455, 485 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property 
Course Handbook Series No. 8966, 2006). 
 178. DHS TRIP, supra note 115. 
 179. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE DHS 
TRAVELER REDRESS INQUIRY PROGRAM (DHS TRIP) 12 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_dhstrip.pdf. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) allows 
those who feel that they were wrongly detained or delayed to file redress complaints. DHS TRIP, 
supra note 115. DHS explains that its redress process is intended “to help travelers improve their travel 
experience and correct inaccuracies.” U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security Website, Step 3: After Your 
Inquiry, August 2, 2007, http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/programs/gc_1169827489374.shtm. DHS notes 
because travelers may be selected for enhanced screening due to a variety of reasons or at random, a 
redress resolution “may not resolve all of your travel-related concerns in the future.” Id.  
 180. SECURITY ROUNDUP, AIRPORT SECURITY REPORT, Feb. 13, 2008, 2008 WLNR 2881025 
(explaining that measures taken to ameliorate the process for innocent individuals getting off the “No-
Fly” list provide little help as the lists are fluid and regularly updated); Editorial, No-Fly List Belongs 
in the Wastebasket, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, at 2P, 2007 WLNR 22305650 (although 
procedures exist to get off the “No-Fly” list, they are lengthy, bureaucratic, and not always successful); 
see SOLOVE, supra note 43, at 182 (explaining that twenty-nine-year-old member of the U.S. national 
rowing team with a Muslim last name was repeatedly detained by officials at the airport, causing him 
to miss flights). Senator Kennedy was only able to remove himself from the “No Fly” list after 
appealing to then–Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge. Rotenberg Testimony, supra note 174, at 
2. The ordinary citizen affected by watch list errors could not invoke this option. Id.  
 181. 60 Minutes, supra note 174. An Army major, Robert Johnson, shares the same name as a 
sixty-two-year-old man convicted of plotting to bomb a Hindu temple in Toronto who was 
subsequently deported to Trinidad. Id. Because the “No Fly” list apparently only provides a name to 
operators, individuals with the same name face extensive screening, no matter the circumstances. Id.  
 182. COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE NOTES, MAY 7, 
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These and other notices failed to explain the grounds for the agency’s 
termination of benefits.183 Furthermore, individuals have reported that they 
received multiple, inconsistent messages within the same month.184 In 
2005, one Colorado family received seventy-one conflicting notices 
regarding their Medicaid benefits in a six-month period.185  
Automated public benefits systems have changed or terminated 
benefits without providing any warning at all.186 Similarly, some 
individuals never received notice of their erroneous dead-beat status or of 
the state’s intent to collect the allegedly unpaid child-support debt from 
them.187 As a result, states can obtain default judgments against innocent 
individuals, garnishing their wages, intercepting federal and state tax 
refunds, and revoking driver’s and professional licenses.188 States can also 
notify credit agencies of these unpaid default judgments.189 In the wake of 
a default judgment, an individual wrongfully labeled a dead-beat parent 
will find it difficult to prove his innocence and restore his credit.190 
Automated systems often fail to maintain audit trails of their decisions, 
further compounding the problems caused by automation.191 Audit trails 
 
 
2005, at 2 (May 7, 2005). 
 183. DELOITTE, supra note 73, at 21 (explaining that the system does not tell the user whether they 
fail due to income limits, inadequate relationship, living arrangements and instead simply says 
“Eligibility Denied”); COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, DECISION TABLE RELEASE 
NOTES, JANUARY 29, 2005, at 2 (Jan. 29, 2005) (“client was getting wrong notice” for not signing a 
form but should have been notified that the problem was ineligibility for SSI due to income); see also 
April M. Washington, Hearing Eyes Benefits Woes: Counties’ Concerns About Overpayments to 
Needy at Issue, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 18, 2007, at 6A (explaining that CBMS system has generated 
11,000 notices of overpayment that fail to tell clients what to do). 
 184. Karen Augé, Contempt Orders Sought Over Benefits Backlog, DENVER POST, Apr. 7, 2005, 
at B1 (explaining that CBMS participants receive dozens of contradictory notices about eligibility); see 
also Dick Foster, System Bugs Still Plaguing Welfare Offices, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 17, 2005, at 
29A (explaining that CBMS paid individuals benefits one month and the next sent a faulty notice 
saying the individuals were over paid and were required to pay back benefits).  
 185. Fukami & McCubbrey, supra note 111, at 488. 
 186. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint at 8, Christina DeLeon et al. v. Jim Hine, Civ. No. 
A03CA816LY, (W.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2004); Class Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Administrative 
Mandamus, Juan Ledezma et al. v. Sandra Shewry, Civ. 07-507057 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 
2007) (alleging that automatic termination of Medicare benefits without notice violates CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 14005.37). 
 187. DELAWARE JOINT SUNSET COMMITTEE, DRAFT REPORT OF THE DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT, NO. 1441430001, at 10 (Jan. 2005) (on file with author) (finding difficulties with 
paternity establishment data). 
 188. Id.; Garvey, supra note 50, at B7 (explaining that over seventy percent of paternity 
establishments in Los Angeles County were by default and over twenty percent of those defaults 
involved innocent individuals). 
 189. Garvey, supra note 50, at B7. 
 190. See Citron, supra note 51, at 253 (describing difficulties that individuals face in repairing 
mistakes on credit reports). 
 191. COLO. AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 93, at 41.  
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record the facts and rules supporting a computer program’s decision.192 
Although the system designers of TIERS and CBMS could have included 
audit trails, they chose not to do so. These systems are unable to generate 
transaction histories showing the “decisions with respect to each eligibility 
criterion for each type of assistance” in individual cases.193 This leaves “no 
way to determine . . . what information was used to determine benefits.”194 
As a result, workers cannot check for errors in an individual’s case.195  
The “No Fly” computer system similarly fails to provide a way to trace 
the basis of the system’s decisions.196 The underlying information and data 
matching techniques are not made available to those affected by the 
program. Even the system’s administrators are unable to understand the 
logical and factual bases for the inferences made by the program.197 
Without access to the logic of a “No Fly” determination, an individual 
cannot meaningfully challenge it. Moreover, the system’s lack of 
statements of reasons inevitably strengthens the already formidable 
automation bias, effectively rendering human oversight ineffective.  
Notwithstanding all of these problems, agencies plan to increase 
automation in an attempt to satisfy the public’s demand for services, to 
decrease costs, and to ensure consistent decisions. As the next Part 
explores, agencies must recognize and address the ways in which 
automation undermines the procedural safeguards typically attached to 
individual adjudications and rulemaking under the Due Process Clauses of 
the Constitution and federal and state law.198  
 
 
 192. AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 79, at 23.  
 193. TEXAS OIG, TIERS, supra note 73, at 13; see COLO. AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra 
note 93, at 4, 41 (explaining that EDS did not program CBMS to automatically provide a case history 
for each benefits recipient that would track changes made to an individual’s file). CBMS also cannot 
produce lists of individuals who the system deemed ineligible or whose benefits were terminated. Id. at 
4. 
 194. TEXAS OIG, TIERS, supra note 73, at App. 6; see COLO. AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE AUDIT, 
supra note 93, at 4. 
 195. COLO. AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 93, at 4. 
 196. DHS TRIP, supra note 115. 
 197. DANIEL J. WEITZNER ET AL., MIT COMPUTER SCI. & ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
LABORATORY TECHNICAL REPORT, NO. MIT-CSAIL-TR-2006-007, TRANSPARENT ACCOUNTABLE 
DATA MINING: NEW STRATEGIES FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION 3 (2006), available at http://www.w3. 
org/2006/01/tami-privacy-strategies-aaai.pdf.  
 198. This Article focuses on the impact that automation has on the procedural protections afforded 
individuals. The use of the Internet to enhance public participation in rulemaking is beyond the scope 
this Article. For more on this topic, see Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in 
Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 435–36 (2004) (discussing e-rulemaking as a way to reform the 
administrative process by encouraging widespread public participation). 
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II. PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IMPERILED BY AUTOMATION 
This Part considers the procedural costs that automated systems 
impose. Section A demonstrates how automation can blur the line between 
adjudication and rulemaking, confounding the procedural protections 
governing both systems. Section B shows the many ways in which the 
combination of adjudication and rulemaking in automated systems comes 
at the expense of individual rights. Section C assesses the difficulties that 
courts will likely face when reviewing rules embedded in, and 
adjudications performed by, automated systems. 
A. Combining Adjudication and Rulemaking in Automated Systems  
In the twentieth century, agency decisions typically came in the form of 
either adjudications or policy-making.199 In adjudications, procedural due 
process safeguards the important interests of individuals when an agency 
acts against a person or a small group of people on the basis of their 
particular circumstances.200 Londoner v. City of Denver201 epitomizes this 
approach. Londoner held that due process protected property owners who 
had been subjected to a special tax as a result of the owners’ specific 
situations.202 
When agencies adopt policies that affect a large number of people, by 
contrast, no individualized due process protections apply.203 As Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes explained in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State 
Board of Equalization,204 “[w]here a rule of conduct applies to more than a 
few people it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in 
its adoption.”205 Instead, as the twentieth century progressed, Congress 
established rulemaking procedures intended to enlighten agencies’ 
policymaking with public input.206 The opportunity to participate in 
rulemaking was seen as a substitute for individualized due process.207 
The archetypal Londoner/Bi-Metallic distinction has long animated the 
separate, yet parallel, procedural regimes that govern individual 
 
 
 199. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 4, § 1.8. 
 200. Id. 
 201. 210 U.S. 373 (1908). 
 202. Id. at 386. 
 203. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 131 (1985). 
 204. 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
 205. Id. at 445.  
 206. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 470 (1983). 
 207. Id. 
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adjudications and rulemaking.208 Today’s automated systems, however, 
resist this traditional classification.209 Now, computers both render 
decisions about important individual rights and engage in rulemaking.210  
Colorado’s public benefits system, CBMS, captures this point well. 
CBMS adjudicates individuals’ property interests in Medicaid benefits 
based on their unique circumstances, adjudications that would typically 
fall within the meaning of Londoner. Because the programmers changed 
hundreds of established rules when encoding them into the system, CBMS 
also articulates new rules in the spirit of Bi-Metallic.211 Although these 
changes may have been caused by programming problems, rather than an 
agency’s deliberate decision to make new rules, the improperly encoded 
policies nonetheless affect a significant number of Colorado residents. The 
computer programmers made new policy by encoding rules that distorted 
or violated established policy.  
Significant problems result when individual adjudications and 
rulemaking are combined in computer systems. An inaccurate decision 
could result from incorrect factual adjudications, invalid policy, or both. 
The opacity of automated systems prevents an easy determination of the 
source of the error. This creates confusion about the procedures owed 
individuals, interfering with both due process guarantees and rulemaking 
procedures. 
Consider this example. In Colorado, a sixty-year-old food stamp 
recipient informs an eligibility worker that she lost her apartment. The 
recipient explains that she initially stayed at her sister’s house for two 
weeks, but that she now lives on the streets. Under federal law, those 
considered “homeless” receive certain accommodations, such as income 
deductions, which can result in higher food stamp allotments.212 
 
 
 208. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 279 (4th ed. 2004) 
(positing that Londoner/Bi-Metallic distinction should be interpreted broadly to mean that due process 
safeguards do not apply to agency policymaking that deprives large number of people of protected 
interest because political process provides them adequate safeguards); Minnesota State Bd. for Comm. 
Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (explaining that considerations identified in Bi-Metallic 
were “as weighty [in 1984] as they were in 1915”). 
 209. Of course, even in the twentieth century, the distinctions between individual adjudications 
and rulemaking, so central to the Administrative Procedure Act, were not perfectly conceived. Some 
agency action fell within a grey area between them. 
 210. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998) (explaining that code can regulate through rules 
embedded in system’s architecture). 
 211. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting that CBMS programmers changed over 
nine hundred rules). 
 212. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e)(6)(D) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
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Individuals can be considered homeless even if they reside somewhere 
temporarily, so long as their stay lasts less than ninety days.213  
The worker enters the recipient’s information into CBMS. The 
computer program asks the worker to identify the woman’s living situation 
from a list of options that includes homelessness.214 The system also 
requires the worker to enter whether or not the recipient is a “beggar.”215 
The system decides that the recipient should not be recognized as 
homeless under federal law and determines the amount of her food stamps. 
The worker adopts the decision.  
The recipient will be unable to determine exactly why the system 
declined to categorize her as homeless because CBMS is a black box.216 
The system’s finding could be based on the worker’s erroneous 
interpretation of the facts regarding the recipient’s stay with her sister. It 
could be the result of an incorrect rule encoded in the system. For instance, 
it could be that CBMS was programmed to exclude individuals from 
homeless status if they temporarily stayed with relatives, in contravention 
of established policy.  
The denial could also stem from the answer the worker gave to the 
question about whether the recipient was a “beggar.” That answer 
involved a factual adjudication about the manner in which the recipient 
receives income, but it also may have articulated a new rule. Neither 
federal nor state policy requires administrators to ask if individuals 
receiving food stamps are “beggars.”217 
Due to the system’s opacity, the process owed the recipient is unclear. 
Procedural due process is certainly implicated if the system deprived the 
recipient of her property interest in food stamps based on inaccurate facts. 
If the system’s error involved the creation of a new rule, the recipient 
should have been given the opportunity to comment on it. And if the 
decision’s inaccuracy resulted from both factual errors and illicit rules, 
 
 
 213. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000); 7 U.S.C. § 2012(s)(2)(c) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (“[A] 
homeless individual . . . [is] an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is a temporary 
accommodation for not more than 90 days in the residence of another individual.”). 
 214. Bill Scanlon, Pressure to Go Online, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 1, 2004, at 5A. 
 215. See id. (explaining that CBMS asked workers if participants were homeless and if that 
answer was yes, then the system asked if the person was a “beggar”).  
 216. Bill Scanlon, Welfare Computer System Faces Review, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 17, 2005, 
at 4A. 
 217. Scanlon, supra note 214, at 5A. Many eligibility workers expressed dismay that CBMS asked 
them to assess whether a claimant was a “beggar” as no federal or state policy warranted such a 
patently offensive inquiry. Id. Indeed, the system’s demand that workers ask such a crude and insulting 
question may anger and humiliate the claimant and cause her to drop off the program. This would 
constitute another form of automation-induced error.  
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both due process and rulemaking procedures would presumably protect the 
recipient’s interests.  
As the next section explains, in the automated administrative state, 
neither due process nor policymaking procedures adequately protect 
individuals like the Coloradan food stamps recipient. Automation 
jeopardizes the due process safeguards owed individuals and destroys the 
twentieth-century assumption that policymaking will be channeled through 
participatory procedures that significantly reduce the risk that an arbitrary 
rule will be adopted.  
B. Procedures Protecting Individuals in Jeopardy 
1. Threats to Due Process  
Automated decisions often deprive individuals of their liberty and 
property, triggering the safeguards of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.218 For example, computers can terminate 
individuals’ Medicaid benefits, impairing a statutorily-granted property 
interest.219 The FPLS can designate innocent individuals as dead-beat 
parents, resulting in lost property, revoked driver’s and professional 
licenses, and injury to their reputations.220 The federal government’s “No 
Fly” data matching program labels some individuals as potential terrorists, 
resulting in the postponement or denial of air travel, both significant 
impairments of liberty rights.221  
a. Notice  
Automated decision systems endanger the basic right to be given notice 
of an agency’s intended actions. This right requires that notice be 
 
 
 218. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 219. Provision of Hearing System, 42 C.F.R. § 431.205 (2006) (requiring Medicaid agencies to 
provide evidentiary hearing that comports with due process standards set forth in Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254 (1970)). 
 220. E.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701–03 (1976) (refusing to find due process rights 
implicated based on reputational harms without evidence of property or liberty harm); Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (finding due process right implicated in case involving harm 
to liberty and reputation).  
 221. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961) (“One may not have 
a constitutional right to go to Baghdad, but the Government may not prohibit one from going there 
unless by means consonant with due process of law.”) (quoting Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 
722 (D.C. Cir. 1961)); Steinbock, supra note 76, at 52 (explaining that “No Fly” list can impinge on 
liberty and property interests of individuals whose travel documents are held while a match is 
confirmed and who are denied air travel).  
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“reasonably calculated” to inform individuals of the government’s 
claims.222 The sufficiency of notice depends upon its ability to inform 
affected individuals about the issues to be decided, the evidence 
supporting the government’s position, and the agency’s decisional 
process.223 Clear notice decreases the likelihood that agency action will 
rest upon “incorrect or misleading factual premises or on the 
misapplication of rules.”224 
Some decision systems fail to provide any pre-deprivation notice of 
agency actions. For instance, CalWIN and TIERS have terminated public 
benefits without prior notification.225 Some individuals erroneously 
labeled dead-beats never received notice of their purported debts.226 The 
“No Fly” program provides no notice of its decisions, much less of the 
evidence supporting them.227  
Even when systems provide notice, it is often inadequate. Recipients of 
public benefits receive termination notices that provide little information 
about the reasons supporting an automated system’s decisions.228 
Inadequate notices are particularly common in systems that do not 
maintain audit trails, such as CBMS and TIERS.229 As a result, affected 
individuals lack the information they would need to effectively respond to 
an agency’s claims.230 Without sufficient warning of the government’s 
position, resulting administrative hearings resemble a “scene from 
Kafka.”231  
 
 
 222. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (assessing notice provided inmate 
under the Mullane reasonableness standard and finding certified mail to prison reasonably calculated 
to reach inmate); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950). 
 223. JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 176 (1985); see, e.g., 
Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 489–90 (7th Cir. 1974) (ruling that notice violated due process 
because it failed to inform public benefits recipients why their benefits were reduced, compounding 
problems created by human tendency to assume action taken by government agency is correct). 
 224. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970); see also Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 
2004); Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 225. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra note 187. 
 227. Steinbock, supra note 76, at 64–65.  
 228. See supra text accompanying note 183. 
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 191–95. 
 230. Cosby v. Ward, 843 F.2d 967, 984 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding computer-generated notices 
deficient because they failed to tell claimants that they violated a rule of thumb); see also Screws v. 
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) (finding that enforcement of laws that fail to adequately convey 
their terms “would be like sanctioning the practice of Caligula who ‘published the law, but it was 
written in a very small hand, and posted up in a corner, so that no one could make a copy of it.’”) 
(citation omitted).  
 231. Cosby, 843 F.2d at 982 (citation omitted); see MASHAW, supra note 223, at 175–76 
(“Kafkaesque procedures take away the participants’ ability to engage in rational planning about their 
situation, to make informed choices among their options.”). 
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b. Opportunity to be Heard 
Automation presents novel problems for a standard Mathews v. 
Eldridge232 cost-benefit analysis. A Mathews analysis is used to determine 
the nature of due process hearings owed individuals whose life, liberty, or 
property is threatened by agency action.233 Under Mathews, courts weigh 
the value of the person’s threatened interest, the probable benefit of 
additional or substitute procedures, and the government’s asserted 
interests, including the cost of additional safeguards.234 Mathews balances 
the value of enhanced accuracy against the cost of obtaining it, while 
aspiring to provide individuals with an opportunity to be heard “at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”235  
In agency actions involving Medicaid, courts have held that due 
process requires a pre-termination Goldberg v. Kelly236 evidentiary 
hearing, where individuals can present evidence and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses before an impartial decision maker.237 Despite these 
safeguards, an agency might still erroneously deprive a recipient of 
important benefits. A hearing officer may be influenced by automation 
bias, and thus be less inclined to entertain an individual’s arguments, 
especially if the individual lacks the ability to reconstruct the entire 
eligibility determination as it should have occurred. Although hearing 
officers may be impartial among human witnesses, they likely have a bias 
for computer systems.238  
Such bias, however, would not disqualify hearing officers, diminishing 
the value of a hearing. Courts typically limit findings of prejudice to 
adjudicators who have some personal connection with the individuals 
appearing before them.239 Officers who have no disqualifying personal 
 
 
 232. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 233. Id. at 334–35. 
 234. Id. at 335. Judge Richard Posner describes the utilitarian balancing test in Mathews as 
minimizing the sum of the cost of erroneous judicial decisions and the cost of operating the procedural 
system. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 563 (6th ed. 2003). 
 235. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (citations omitted); id. at 347–49. 
 236. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 237. E.g. Id. at 269–71; 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.205, 431.220(a)(2) (2006) (requiring Goldberg-type 
evidentiary hearings for decisions under Medicaid Act); see, e.g., Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559 
(6th Cir. 2004) (finding property interest protected by procedural due process for applicants who had 
hoped to qualify for Medicaid benefits but were denied); see Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of 
Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279–81 (1975) (highlighting importance of an unbiased tribunal, 
clear notice of grounds for agency action, and a chance to present reasons why agency should not take 
action).  
 238. See text accompanying notes 146–53 (discussing automation bias). 
 239. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195–97 (1982) (holding that the prescription that 
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connection with individuals but who are influenced by automation bias 
might endorse inaccurate computer decisions even in the face of contrary 
evidence. Under present conditions, the guarantee of an impartial reviewer 
may be illusory.  
Access to an automated program’s source code—the programmer’s 
instructions to the computer—might provide a meaningful way for 
individuals to challenge an agency’s claims and dispel the influence of 
automation bias.240 Hearings about the logic of a computer program’s 
decision would require experts to decipher and explain the code and its 
operation.241 Unfortunately, the Mathews calculus likely would not 
provide such additional process. Courts would likely find that the cost of 
this expert testimony would outweigh both the individual interest involved 
and the reduction in the risk of erroneous deprivation.242  
Whatever the merits of this sort of cost-benefit calculation in twentieth-
century hearings, it cannot respond effectively to automated decision 
making. Computer systems fundamentally change the costs and benefits of 
additional process in ways Mathews could not have anticipated. Expert 
testimony unraveling a computer’s decision would be expensive. But it 
 
 
hearing officers are unbiased can only be overcome by a showing of a conflict of interest such as 
financial interest at stake); see also 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 4, § 9.8 (discussing the neutral 
decision maker); 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (2000) (describing disqualification grounds for judges). An 
officer’s views about law or policy do not constitute grounds for disqualification. NLRB v. Pittsburgh 
S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656, 659 (1949) (“[T]otal rejection of an opposed view cannot of itself impugn the 
integrity or competence of a trier of fact.”); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 416 (1941) 
(finding that expression of strong views did not disqualify decision maker). 
 240. See Christopher W. Clifton et al., Data Mining and Privacy: An Overview, in PRIVACY AND 
TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY 191, 203 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006) 
(explaining that, without access to the underlying data and logic of the “No Fly” program, individual’s 
ability to challenge inclusion on list is impaired).  
 241. Telephone Interview with Andy Bardwell, Systems Analyst, in Denver, Colo. (Apr. 9, 2007) 
(notes on file with author) (explaining that even if Colorado’s Department of Health and Human 
Services had published the code of CBMS, it would be an expensive and time-consuming task to 
decipher); Grimmelmann, supra note 29, at 1745 (“[Examining software] is not a hunt for a needle in a 
haystack. It is a hunt for the broken needle in a field covered two feet deep in other needles.”). 
 242. The standard Mathews v. Eldridge analysis typically involves requests for additional process 
that would enhance the accuracy of factual determinations. Ascertaining the law that an automated 
system applied arguably constitutes a factual issue. In the automated administrative state, the de facto 
rules are hidden from hearing officers who may be inclined to adopt a computer’s finding without 
checking the accuracy of a computer-generated decision. Determining the de facto rules constitutes a 
factual question that must be resolved to achieve more accurate results. Moreover, the Court applied a 
Mathews v. Eldridge analysis in a child custody case where the proposed additional process—
appointed counsel—might have enhanced the legal and factual accuracy of an agency’s decision to 
terminate parental rights in a neglect case. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27–31 (1981). 
Although the Lassiter majority refused to appoint counsel because the issues were not sufficiently 
complex, the Court noted that another case might present sufficiently complicated issues to warrant 
such additional process. Id. at 31–32. Mathews v. Eldridge arguably extends to additional process that 
would enhance the accuracy of factual and legal issues.  
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may also facilitate corrections of the system’s code by identifying 
software flaws or invalid rules embedded in the system. When 
programmers remedy software errors, there are virtually no costs to 
replicate that improvement in future cases.243 Thus, any Mathews analysis 
that focuses on a single adjudication will capture all of the costs of 
improved process but only a tiny fraction of its benefits.  
This differs from the typical due process case of last century involving 
relatively inexpensive fixed costs but burdensome variable ones.244 In 
Goss v. Lopez,245 for instance, the Supreme Court found no due process 
right to full-blown evidentiary hearings for nine students facing temporary 
suspensions from school.246 The Court reasoned that even though the 
added procedure for the nine students would not be expensive, the value of 
the individual interests at stake did not warrant the additional process 
given the significant expense of providing such process in all future 
cases.247  
The Mathews calculus implicitly assumes that the significant costs will 
be repeated in all future cases. In the twentieth century, that was certainly 
true. Providing improvements for future cases necessarily imposed 
burdensome expenditures. For instance, if the Goss Court had upheld the 
students’ right to a full-blown hearing, the cost of such a hearing would 
have been incurred in all future cases where students faced temporary 
suspensions.  
With automated systems, however, future cases will benefit from the 
additional process almost without charge. Once experts correct a problem 
in a system’s software, that cost never needs to be replicated. Every future 
use of the improved system is practically free.248 As a result, unless 
calculated with the entire run of cases that a software program will decide 
in mind, the Mathews calculus will overstate the burden of introducing 
experts to explain the code. The Mathews analysis fails to spread the fixed 
 
 
 243. See Grimmelmann, supra note 29, at 1729 (explaining that once a piece of software is 
written, the marginal cost of using the program is low). 
 244. This Article uses the term “fixed costs” to refer to the expense of the additional process—the 
expert testimony—in the case before the court. It uses the term “variable costs” to refer to the 
accumulating cost of that additional process in all future cases. 
 245. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 246. Id. at 582–84. 
 247. Id. at 583–84; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680–82 (1977) (finding no due process 
right to a hearing owed school children facing punishment by “paddling” because incremental benefit 
of hearing would not justify the cost as hearings require time, personnel, and diversion of school 
resources and because the risk of error would be low). 
 248. See Grimmelmann, supra note 29, at 1729 (explaining that software is an inexpensive way to 
solve problems because once written, marginal cost of running a program to handle other cases is 
vanishingly small). 
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costs across the variable benefits of achieving a more accurate outcome in 
each future case. The due process analysis should be recalibrated to 
compare fixed costs with the significant benefit of avoiding errors in 
countless future cases.249  
“No Fly” adjudications raise different Mathews issues. The government 
refuses to produce the matching algorithms and the information contained 
in the “No Fly” databases on national security grounds. The additional 
process necessary to decipher the algorithms and the information, if 
released by the government, would also be expensive. As a result, the 
Mathews calculus would likely deny hearings on the “No Fly” matching 
system because the government’s anti-terror interests and the high fixed 
cost of expert testimony would likely outweigh the individual’s liberty and 
property interests and the value of added procedures.250  
Some have suggested that a Mathews analysis might contemplate the 
creation of an independent advisory board with security clearance to 
review the outcomes of the “No Fly” data matching program and to make 
recommendations for its revision.251 Such a board could examine the 
number of false positives and false negatives produced by the program.252 
Although an expert board might provide a balanced assessment of the 
program’s computerized reasoning,253 an extensive review of the 
program’s algorithms would be costly. The current due process analysis 
thus might find that such a searching review outweighs any benefits.  
More generally, secret algorithms raise serious concerns.254 In certain 
 
 
 249. Such aggregated future benefits should, of course, be discounted to their present value. Some 
due process scholars argue that Mathews should not just look at individual costs and benefits but 
should also consider society’s interest in added procedures. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural 
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 306 (2004) (providing a theoretical account of due process that would 
“maximize systemic accuracy where the arrangement will not result in inaccuracy in particular cases”); 
Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 79–80 (1992) (offering 
“communitarian” view of due process that would assess benefits of additional procedures by looking at 
individuals or groups directly affected by decision). 
 250. To be sure, such a determination involves a subjective assessment of the decision maker. See 
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in 
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 39 (1976). But most 
would agree that anti-terrorism concerns are sufficiently weighty so as to tilt the scales against the 
individual’s interest in additional process. 
 251. Steinbock, supra note 76, at 79. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Frank Pasquale and Oren Bracha have raised important concerns about the opacity and lack 
of accountability in the algorithms running search engines. Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale, Federal 
Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008); Frank Pasquale, Taking on the Unknowns, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Aug. 12, 
2007), available at http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/08/taking_on_the_k.html (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2008). 
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instances, algorithms must prove themselves in practice. For example, an 
algorithm for picking stocks that leads to losses would likely be adjusted 
or dropped. If the computerized logic used to predict credit card fraud 
regularly errs, it would likely be discarded. Yet algorithms in public 
automated systems are not necessarily subject to revision and review 
based on their performance in practice. At best, they may be tested for 
false negatives. For instance, if a terrorist slips through the system and is 
allowed to fly, the algorithms designed to prevent terrorists from flying 
might indeed be studied and fixed. But if an algorithm mistakenly 
identifies a four-year-old child as a potential terrorist, the algorithm will 
probably not be probed for over-inclusiveness. Correcting only one type of 
error in an algorithm or encoded rule tends to systematize bias.  
One could argue that, under Parratt v. Taylor255 and its progeny, 
deprivations arising from programming mistakes warrant only tort 
remedies, not procedural due process. In Parratt, a state prisoner sued 
prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to provide him due 
process in a case where prison guards negligently lost materials that he 
ordered by mail.256 The Court found no procedural due process violation 
because pre-deprivation process would be “impossible” to provide, and 
because the prisoner had a meaningful post-deprivation tort remedy.257 
The Court explained that because the state could not foresee an 
employee’s “random and unauthorized act,” it could not provide process in 
advance of the prison guards’ negligence.258 
The Court has limited Parratt’s application to cases where “no matter 
how significant the private interest at stake and the risk of its erroneous 
deprivation,” pre-deprivation process would be impossible to provide.259 
In Zinermon v. Burch,260 the plaintiff sued officials of a mental hospital for 
admitting him as a voluntary patient without a hearing when they knew or 
should have known that he could not make an informed decision about his 
own admission.261 The Zinermon Court upheld the plaintiff’s procedural 
 
 
 255. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
 256. Id. at 529. 
 257. Id. at 541. 
 258. Id. The Court extended the Parratt holding to cases involving the random, intentional acts of 
state prison guards whose abuse of position could not be predicted. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 
533 (1984) (finding it impossible for state to provide pre-deprivation process in case where prison 
guard destroyed property of inmate to avenge a personal vendetta).  
 259. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 130 (1990). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 123–24. 
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due process claim because pre-deprivation process was not impossible to 
provide.262  
At the outset, the Court made clear that the mere availability of tort 
remedies did not extinguish the plaintiff’s due process right to a pre-
deprivation hearing.263 The Court distinguished Parratt because, unlike the 
prison officials who could not possibly predict when guards might 
negligently lose a prisoner’s mail, the hospital officials could foresee that 
individuals seeking treatment for mental illness might be incapable of 
informed consent.264 The Court concluded that the state should have held a 
hearing before admitting the plaintiff as a voluntary patient.265  
Parratt has no application here. Unlike the unpredictable conduct of 
the prison guard in Parratt, programming mistakes happen all the time. As 
the problems with CBMS and the “No Fly” program make clear, agency 
officials can reasonably expect that software flaws or crude algorithms 
will produce erroneous decisions that impair the important rights of 
individuals. In that regard, our case is akin to Zinermon. Because agency 
officials ultimately control the administration of automated decision 
systems, pre-deprivation process is surely possible.  
Administrative law has long presumed that rulemaking procedures help 
protect against arbitrariness when due process does not apply. The next 
section explores how that presumption fails in an age of automation. 
2. Avoiding Participation and Transparency in Rulemaking  
Computer programmers inevitably engage in rulemaking when they 
construct an automated system’s code. Whether or not the distortion in 
policy was intentional, the encoding process lacks procedural safeguards 
mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), and similar state laws. Such inadvertent 
rulemaking by programmers constitutes a troubling delegation of 
legislative power. 
a. Notice and Comment 
Automated systems establish new policy when they embed distorted or 
simplified rules. Section 551 of the APA defines a “rule” as an “agency 
 
 
 262. Id. at 136. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 136–37. 
 265. Id. 
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statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed 
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”266 Automated policy 
falls within the APA’s definition of a rule, as it articulates general policy 
that prospectively affects a large number of individuals.  
Some might argue that a rule is “new” only if an agency actually 
intends to set forth new policy. Automated rules that reflect “street-level” 
welfare policy fall under this conception of a rule.267 A strong argument 
also exists that policy changes caused by programming mistakes constitute 
new rules, regardless of the agency’s specific motive. Courts, interpreting 
Section 551 of the APA, look to an agency’s actions to determine if an 
agency has adopted a new rule.268 For instance, the D.C. Circuit found that 
an agency’s practice of adhering to a policy statement in approximately 
292 out of 300 cases illustrated that the agency had, in fact, adopted a new 
rule.269 An automated system’s application of distorted policy in hundreds 
of thousands of cases similarly can be seen as establishing a new rule.  
Whether accomplished overtly through informal rulemaking or 
covertly through programming, new rules must be issued in accordance 
with the APA and its state analogues.270 Although section 553(a)(2) of the 
APA exempts agency actions relating to “public property, loans, grants, 
benefits, or contracts” from notice-and-comment rulemaking, Congress 
and federal agencies have overridden that exemption for public benefits 
programs such as Medicaid and food stamps.271 State administrative 
procedure acts, in turn, govern the state’s administration of public benefits 
programs.272 When a state agency interprets an existing rule in a 
 
 
 266. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 4, § 7. 2 (explaining that agencies 
adopt general laws or rules where “facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general 
facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion”); see also Bi-Metallic 
Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 442 (1915). 
 267. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text (discussing “street-level” welfare policy 
studied by Professor Evelyn Brodkin of the University of Chicago). 
 268. See U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 269. Id. 
 270. For discussion of state APAs and open-government laws, see generally ARTHUR EARL 
BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING (1986); Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA 
and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297 (1986). The APAs of over half of the states are 
based on the Model State APA. MICHAEL ASIMOW ET AL., STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 5 (2d ed. 1998).  
 271. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (a)(2) (2000); see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (2000) (requiring USDA to control 
food stamp program through “uniform national standards” promulgated through informal rulemaking); 
Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that HHS’s waiver of APA 
exemption remains in effect until HHS says otherwise). Federal regulations require that changes in 
state Medicaid policy be discussed in advance with the state Medical Care Advisory Committee. See 
supra note 41. 
 272. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (2006) (“Within broad Federal rules, each State decides eligible 
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substantially different manner from a prior interpretation of that rule, or 
creates a new rule, the agency usually must provide notice-and-comment 
participation.273 Notice-and-comment rulemaking requires agencies to 
publish the rule, solicit the public’s comments, and issue a final rule that 
responds to those comments and articulates the basis for the rule.274  
Rulemaking by code fails to satisfy the notice-and-comment 
requirement.275 Agencies have not published the source code or data model 
of automated public benefits systems such as CBMS or TIERS. Because 
vendors typically build these systems, the source code is proprietary and 
closed.276 The public has no opportunity to review new rules embedded in 
closed source code. Individuals lack notice of the new rules that will bind 
them.277  
Without notice of a change in the rules, citizens lack the information 
they need to respond to such changes. The public cannot provide feedback 
on rules it cannot see.278 The value of participation by interested citizens 
and entities is lost.279 In turn, computer programmers inadvertently create 
rules that cannot be critiqued or improved.280  
Embedding new rules in code undermines the democratic process.281 
Because the public has no opportunity to identify problems with troubled 
 
 
groups, types and range of services, payment levels for services, and administrative and operating 
procedures [for Medicaid program].”); Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1493 (9th Cir. 
1997) (explaining that state administrative procedure governs state’s operation of Medicaid program). 
 273. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-103 (West 2006). The particular contours of public 
participation would naturally depend upon the particular state’s administrative procedure law. States, 
in general, require some form of public participation. BONFIELD, supra note 270, § 6.4.1.  
 274. KERWIN, supra note 3, at 52–57. 
 275. See Clark Petition, supra note 97, at 7–8 (arguing that Florida’s Department of Children and 
Families failed to follow applicable rulemaking procedures for change in rule embedded in design of 
Florida ACCESS online application that precluded relative caregivers from applying for TANF 
benefits in violation of state law).  
 276. See Citron, supra note 32.  
 277. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the 
Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1373 (1992). 
 278. Lee Tien notes that if no one perceives something as a regulation, “no one will complain that 
the government acted unwisely.” Tien, supra note 92, at 43. 
 279. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
CLAIMS 140 (1983); Levy & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 480; Rossi, infra note 282, at 186 (noting that 
“[p]articipation begets better information for the agency decisionmaking process” and encourages 
decision makers to closely scrutinize evidence and arguments). 
 280. The fact that the official rules received notice-and-comment participation is of no 
consequence. When rules are changed, the letter and the spirit of administrative procedure demands 
the transparency, accountability, and expertise that rulemaking provides. 
 281. Cf. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Process of Constitutional Change: From 
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006) 
(describing danger of executive branch’s informational insularity in which the executive is unable or 
unwilling to acknowledge new information that requires public to reshape its plans).  
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systems, it cannot present those complaints to elected officials. In turn, 
government actors are unable to influence policy when it is shrouded in 
closed code.282  
Some scholars argue in favor of granting agencies more deference 
because they are increasingly creatures of a democratically elected 
President and hence are more accountable to the public than has been 
generally assumed.283 Whatever force the executive model of 
administrative law has generally, it has none here. Even the most 
aggressive President will be unable to exercise meaningful oversight over 
opaque code.284  
Altered rules would arguably be exempt from notice-and-comment 
requirements if they constituted interpretative rules or changed other 
interpretative rules.285 Interpretative rules are rules that clarify existing 
norms without constraining agencies’ discretion, whereas rules subject to 
section 553 of the APA and analogous state requirements are rules that 
create binding norms.286 Unfortunately, the opacity of code makes it 
difficult to determine if a change has imposed a “new rule” requiring 
rulemaking procedures or an “interpretative rule” arguably demanding less 
process.  
b. FOIA and Open-Records Laws  
The hidden nature of encoded rules violates open-government laws and 
regulations that are intended to provide the public access to basic 
information about the conduct of agencies.287 FOIA and similar state laws 
 
 
 282. KERWIN, supra note 3, at 263 (explaining that rulemaking is “peculiarly susceptible to 
presidential scrutiny and influence”); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass 
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 182 (1997) 
(“Oversight and accountability rationale is paramount to the legitimacy of agency decisions.”). 
 283. See also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
 284. See Citron, supra note 32 (exploring how closed code systems interfere with Presidential 
model of administrative law). 
 285. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000) (explaining that rulemaking procedures do not apply to 
interpretative rules and policy statements); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules 
From Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 547 (2000) (“[A]n agency can issue an 
interpretative rule at any time without using the notice-and-comment procedure.”). Some courts, 
however, have noted that when an agency changes its interpretative rules, the new interpretative rules 
require notice-and-comment participation. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 
579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“To allow an agency to make a fundamental change in its interpretation of 
a substantive regulation without notice-and-comment requirements would undermine the APA.”).  
 286. M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1434 
(2004); see also Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (explaining that interpretative rules are those that lack the force of law). 
 287. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)–(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
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apply to federal benefits programs.288 Federal rules also contain numerous 
provisions allowing the public to receive information about the operation 
of such programs.289  
Under FOIA and state open-record laws, agencies must publish 
“substantive rules of general applicability,” policy statements,290 and 
interpretative rules, even if some of those rules are not published for 
notice-and-comment.291 Agencies must also make records available to the 
public for inspection.292 Records subject to inspection include electronic 
and digital materials compiled by the government.293 These public-access 
requirements guard against the dangers of secret and unchecked 
government.294  
Automated public benefits systems arguably flout these transparency 
mandates. For instance, the source code of CBMS has not been published 
for review.295 Although FOIA exempts “trade secrets” from its disclosure 
 
 
 288. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(2), (b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (requiring every agency to make available 
for public inspection and copying, inter alia, statements of policy, interpretations not published in 
Federal Registry, and administrative staff manuals with narrow exceptions that do not include benefits 
information).  
 289. 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.3, 271.4, 272.4(c), 273.15(p) (2007). 
 290. “Policy statements” announce an agency’s tentative intentions for the future without binding 
the agency. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987). They are not supposed 
to establish binding norms. Id.; see Anthony, supra note 277, at 1372–73 (raising concerns that policy 
statements do, in fact, create norms).  
 291. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§552.022(a)(10) (Vernon 2004); REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT §§ 201(d), 801 
(Annual Meeting Draft 2006) (proposed electronic publication rule). All fifty states currently have 
open-records laws. Michael Hoefges, Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, Privacy Rights Versus 
FOIA Disclosure Policy: The “Uses and Effects” Double Standard in Access to Personally-
Identifiable Information in Government Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 2 n.3 (2003).  
 292. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. 
PROCEDURE ACT § 201(f) (Annual Meeting Draft July 2006) (proposing a requirement that agencies 
make available for public inspection and copying portions of administrative bulletin and code used in 
discharge of agency functions). Congress included nine exemptions to FOIA, two of which allow 
agencies to withhold information to protect the personal privacy of individuals identified in records 
and databases. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6)–(7) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE 540 (2007) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_ 
guide07.htm (describing exemptions 6 and 7(c)). 
 293. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 3, 110 
Stat. 3048, 3049 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 552(f)). 
 294. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and 
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000). 
 295. Interview with Andy Bardwell, supra note 241. Although the artificial language of computer 
code may be incomprehensible to the average person, interested groups could hire experts who would 
be able to read a system’s “rules base” and “rules engine.” See text accompanying notes 61–64 
(describing “rules-based” systems). 
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requirements,296 that exception is inapplicable to CBMS’s decision tables 
because agency personnel built this portion of the source code.297  
The source codes for systems built exclusively by private vendors, such 
as TIERS and CalWIN, might qualify for FOIA’s “trade secret” 
exemption.298 Interestingly, state agencies have refused FOIA requests for 
the source code of privately built benefits systems on different, and less 
persuasive, grounds. For instance, the Texas Health and Human Services 
Commission (HHSC) rejected a FOIA request to produce the “logical data 
model” for TIERS on the grounds that computer source code did not 
constitute public information.299 HHSC argued that the TIERS code had no 
significance other than as a tool to maintain, manipulate, or protect client 
data.300 The Office of the Texas Attorney General agreed, finding that 
producing the code would divulge “confidential client information.”301  
Contrary to the Texas Attorney General’s position, no sensitive 
personal information would be revealed in the release of the source code 
of the system’s rules base, which embeds policy, or of its rules engine, 
which provides the system’s logic. Although the trade secrets exception to 
FOIA might exempt the disclosure of an automated system’s source code, 
concerns about the release of sensitive client information should not. 
Moreover, even if the trade secrets exemption applies here, the refusal to 
produce the code of automated decision-making systems allows agencies 
to enforce laws that no one can see or monitor, which is the very antithesis 
of open government.302 
 
 
 296. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
 297. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 135–43 and accompanying text (describing TIERS and CalWIN). 
 299. Tex. Att’y Gen., Open Records Ltr. Rul., OR2004-8070 (Sept. 21, 2004), available at http:// 
www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/50abbott/orl/2004/htm/or200408070.htm. The information 
technology companies that design and maintain the vast majority of the automated public benefit 
systems would likely refuse to release the code. Their refusal might stem from a fear that competitors 
might use the data models and source codes to provide more improved systems. Cf. David A. Super, 
Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor: The Third Wave of Challenges to Public Benefit 
Programs, CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).  
 300. Tex. Att’y Gen., Open Records Ltr. Rul., supra note 299.  
 301. Id. (ruling that TIERS data model is not subject to TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.002).  
 302. Computer programmers also arguably comprise advisory committees subject to the 
transparency requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). FACA requires advisory 
committees—those “established or utilized” by the President or an agency for advisory purposes—to 
open their meetings, minutes, reports, and records to the public. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 3(2), 10(a), 10(b) 
(2000). Courts exempt government contractors from FACA’s mandates because procurement 
regulations impose transparency requirements on contractors in order to prevent the misuse of 
government resources. Food Chem. News v. Young, 900 F.2d 328, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 1403-92, at 2 (1972) (Conf. Rep.)). An argument can be made that the contractors here—
computer programmers—should not fall within that exemption. Unlike the transparency provided by 
the contracting process that the FACA exemption addresses, here, the key issue is the opaque nature of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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c. Questionable Delegations of Power 
Automated systems can be conceptualized as de facto delegations of 
rulemaking power. Congress has vested in state officials the power to 
implement and enforce federal programs providing Medicaid, food 
stamps, and other public benefits.303 State agencies, in turn, have enlisted 
information technology consultants to encode policy into decision-making 
programs. Agencies inadvertently give rulemaking power to computer 
programmers who can, and do, alter established policy when embedding it 
into code.  
Automation raises a unique but parallel set of issues to those that the 
courts addressed in another era involving delegations to administrative 
agencies. In the 1930s, the Supreme Court raised concerns about the lack 
of political accountability in Congress’s sweeping delegations to the 
executive branch. In two 1935 cases, the Court required Congress to set 
meaningful limits on the discretion afforded agencies.304 The Court has 
since set the bar very low for what constitutes a sufficient limitation,305 
 
 
the advice that software engineers provide in embedding new rules into an automated system’s code. 
Such programmers do not solely execute policy. Instead, they effectively provide advice to the agency 
by changing established policy in the course of translating it into computer language and encoding it. 
That advice is, in turn, adopted by the agency through its automated decision system. Because FACA 
aims to secure transparency in the policy advice given to agencies, the spirit of the statute counsels its 
applicability to the consultants that design automated systems like the Federal Parent Locator Service. 
See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and 
the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 139 (2000) (questioning whether private company running ICANN 
on behalf of Department of Commerce should be covered by FACA’s mandates). 
 303. For instance, Congress has delegated substantial authority to the states to administer 
Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396s (2000). Although the Medicaid statute establishes binding policy, 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2000), and the Secretary of Health and Human Services issues regulations 
expanding them, 42 C.F.R. pt. 430–56 (2006), participating states must design programs that lay out 
the conditions of eligibility and covered services. 42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (2006). 
 304. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating a section of National 
Industrial Recovery Act that delegated power to prohibit shipment of “hot oil” in interstate commerce 
to President because the statute failed to provide standard governing when the President could exercise 
that power); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935) (striking 
down delegation to President and groups of private citizens the power to prescribe codes governing 
businesses subject to federal authority because statute “does not undertake to prescribe rules of 
conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure”). 
As John Hart Ely explains, the fundamental principle of nondelegation is the accountability of 
government decision making. ELY, supra note 4, at 132–33; see also Froomkin, supra note 302, at 146 
(exploring how nondelegation doctrine aims to ensure that “public power is exercised in a manner that 
makes it both formally and, insofar as possible, actually accountable to elected officials, and through 
them—we hope—to the electorate”); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 303, 335–37 (1999) (contending that constitutional goal of ensuring an accountable 
deliberative democracy and concern for the rule of law animate nondelegation theory).  
 305. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424–26 (1944) (“Only if we could say that there is an 
absence of standards for the guidance of the Administrator’s action, so that it would be impossible in a 
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and the APA’s procedural constraints on the exercise of delegated 
discretion have effectively replaced the nondelegation doctrine.306 The 
Court, however, has never abandoned the nondelegation doctrine, and 
some state courts have enforced more robust versions of it.307  
Automated systems impose accountability deficits that administrative 
procedures cannot remedy. Because the policies embedded in code are 
invisible, administrators cannot detect when the rules in an automated 
system depart from formal policy.308 As a result, presidentially or 
gubernatorially appointed agency heads cannot meaningfully review 
programmers’ actions.309 Not surprisingly, administrators fail to provide 
the procedural safeguards that are typically applied to rulemaking.310 
Although administrators are politically accountable due to their 
relationships with elected officials, administrators cannot meaningfully 
review or provide political legitimacy to changes in rules that they cannot 
see and did not propose.311  
 
 
proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in 
overriding its choices of means for effecting its declared purpose[s] . . . .”). Since 1935, as part of a 
shift supporting the developing welfare state, courts have tolerated broad delegations to coequal 
branches and to private parties so long as Congress articulated sufficiently “intelligible principles” to 
guide them. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 580 
(2000); e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472–75 (2001) (upholding § 109(b)(1) of 
the Clean Air Act that required EPA to set air pollution standards to levels “requisite” to protect public 
health as sufficiently “intelligible principle” so as not to offend nondelegation doctrine). 
 306. E.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(emphasizing importance of rule of law in administrative process); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. 
Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759–63 (D.D.C. 1971) (upholding broad delegation of authority to 
President because, in part, administrative procedures would provide check on executive action); see 
also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 50 (2d ed. 1977) 
(explaining that any “hope” to address dangers of delegation should be directed to ensuring that 
administrators clarify standards they use). 
 307. See, e.g., Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1356 (N.Y. 1987) (finding Public Health 
Council exceeded scope of authority delegated to it by legislature). 
 308. See Froomkin, supra note 302, at 142–43 (arguing that Department of Commerce’s handing 
over power to ICANN to regulate Internet violates private nondelegation doctrine because Department 
of Commerce did not retain right to review ICANN’s decisions and because Congress did not clearly 
authorize handing over policymaking to private group but instead agency did so via contract); see also 
FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 875–80 (Tex. 2000) (ruling that private 
delegations deserve more searching scrutiny under eight-part test). 
 309. See Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 473–77 (Tex. 
1997) (striking down delegation to private group because private delegate’s actions were not subject to 
meaningful review by state agency and delegate had personal interest which might be inconsistent with 
public interest). Concerns about accountability would also be true if an agency’s information 
technology specialists, who wrote the code, had no policy experience.  
 310. See supra notes 270–85 (discussing lack of notice-and-comment participation and FOIA 
compliance). 
 311. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .”); JERRY L. 
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p 1249 Citron book pages.doc5/30/2008 1:51:00 PM  
 
 
 
 
 
1296 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:1249 
 
 
 
 
Jody Freeman, Gillian Metzger, David Super, and others are engaged 
in a parallel enterprise to identify appropriate standards for delegations of 
public power to private contractors.312 Conventionally, the nondelegation 
doctrine has been understood as having two components—one limiting 
delegations to public entities, and the other limiting delegations to private 
parties.313 Today, the nondelegation doctrine should be viewed as having 
three parts. Automation produces a new delegation of legislative power to 
automated systems and their designers—a delegation that needs to be 
addressed.  
This third component of the nondelegation doctrine borrows from each 
of the other two, as code is often created by a mix of public and private 
programmers. Delegations to computer systems and their programmers, 
however, are more troubling than delegations to private contractors. The 
type of private delegation addressed by scholars often involves individuals 
or entities that arguably can be viewed as having some expertise in 
carrying out policy objectives, such as doctors in hospitals interpreting 
Medicaid regulations.314 By contrast, code writers lack policy expertise.  
Today’s society requires expertise on technical matters, an expertise 
that agencies can provide and that the public does not possess.315 As 
Justice Stephen Breyer explains, a workable democracy requires “striking 
a balance—some delegation, but not too much . . . [thereby] avoid[ing] 
conflict between democracy and administration.”316 But programmers who 
build code and design algorithms have no authority to engage in 
policymaking. In fact, their mistakes work to essentially, albeit 
unintentionally, usurp an agency’s own expertise and delegated 
 
 
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 145–
57 (1997) (arguing that agency heads are accountable to elected President); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 136–37 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 
2006) (discussing impact of opacity on accountability). 
 312. See Freeman, supra note 305, at 664–65 (proposing a mix of formal and informal 
mechanisms to ensure accountability, transparency, and rationality of private actors involved in 
governance and policy interpretation); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization As Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1367 (2003); Super, supra note 299 (arguing that dismantling agencies that deliver public 
benefits in favor of privatization is ill-advised under the theory of the firm); Harold J. Krent, 
Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside 
the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62 (1990).  
 313. Froomkin, supra note 302, at 143–44. 
 314. Freeman, supra note 305, at 614, 643. 
 315. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 102 
(2005).  
 316. Id.  
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authority.317 The rulemaking power that programmers inadvertently wield 
thus defies the democratic origins and purposes of delegation. 
More generally, the delegation of public power to code writers offends 
rule-of-law principles.318 The rule of law requires that legal directives be 
“duly authorized.”319 Laws should be clear and accessible so that those 
subject to them can know and understand their content.320 But neither 
concern is met here. When computer programmers establish new rules, it 
is often by accident or convenience, not as the result of a thoughtful 
delegation of public power. Encoded rules that change established policy 
cannot be understood by affected individuals or reviewed by more 
democratically accountable superiors.321 In that regard, rulemaking by 
code writers is ultra vires even as it is inevitable.  
d. Expertise and Discretion 
Even if computer programmers minimized, or somehow even 
eliminated, code’s deviation from established policy in a manner that 
dispels accountability and transparency concerns, the automation of 
administrative law poses other problems. Automation encourages agencies 
to adopt overly simplified policy, which can more easily be translated into 
code.322 This forfeits much of the policy expertise that agencies offer.323  
Automation, in time, will be a driving force in the retreat from the 
discretionary model of administrative law.324 Although automation may be 
a superior alternative to discretion in many instances, it would be a 
 
 
 317. See Citron, supra note 32. 
 318. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 438 (2003) (“The traditional core of administrative law has focused on securing the rule of law 
and protecting liberty by ensuring that agencies follow . . . decisional procedures, act within bounds of 
statutory authority delegated by legislature, and respect private rights.”). 
 319. Robert S. Summers, The Principles of the Rule of Law, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1691, 1693 
(1999). 
 320. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 98 (rev. ed. 1969).  
 321. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (2d ed. 1994) (speaking of rules “which multitudes 
of individuals could understand” and without which law could not exist); FULLER, supra note 320, at 
63 (discussing law’s clarity). 
 322. Cf. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Electronic Agency and the Traditional Paradigms of 
Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 96–98 (1992) (predicting that because automation hardens 
rules, automation of administrative law would make rules difficult to apply flexibly). 
 323. FRANCIS E. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 15 (2d ed. 1976) 
(“[D]ealing day in and day out with the same tasks gives public agencies an invaluable kind of 
practical knowledge that comes from experience.”); BREYER, supra note 315, at 102–03. 
 324. See Diller, supra note 294, at 1125; David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of 
the Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815 (2004).  
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mistake to completely eradicate all discretion.325 Kenneth Culp Davis’s 
declaration that discretion is a “principal source of creativeness” in 
government remains true.326 Automation should be pursued only after a 
careful assessment of all risks. Part III provides a framework to assess the 
risks that may result from choosing complete automation over human 
discretion. 
C. Meaningful Judicial Review in Jeopardy  
For the reasons articulated above, code alters policy without 
transparency or participation. The process by which programmers produce 
those changes, in turn, may be so divorced from reasoned policy analysis 
that it amounts to “arbitrary and capricious” action or an “abuse of 
discretion.” Policy, as embedded in code, could do a number of things. It 
could violate federal law. It could alter established rules. It could change 
existing interpretative rules. It could embed distorted policy statements. 
The opacity of software, however, makes it impossible to tell exactly what 
the code has accomplished. Because courts cannot see the rules that were 
actually applied in a given case, meaningful judicial review is impaired.  
Even if the court could somehow discover that code has effectively 
established a new rule, there would be no record supporting the policy 
change. The Supreme Court has long required contemporaneous records of 
agency decision making to facilitate judicial review.327 Without such a 
record, courts cannot determine if an agency has abused its discretion in its 
interpretation of policy or if it based the rule on inappropriate factors.328  
Courts certainly could find encoded policy to be an abuse of discretion 
without knowing the agency’s reasons behind it. Indeed, a court can find 
an agency’s decision arbitrary and capricious precisely because the agency 
has offered little or no reason for its rule.329 Under conventional doctrine, a 
 
 
 325. Diller, supra note 294, at 1126 (discussing problems with new discretionary model for 
administration of public benefits as eligibility workers lack professional norms they once possessed). 
 326. DAVIS, supra note 306, at 15 (explaining that discretion has significant value as well as 
perils, and thus key task is to figure out discretion we ought to discard or that we should impose). 
 327. Perritt, Jr., supra note 322, at 89 (“Judicial review necessitates a ‘record’ of agency 
decisionmaking.”); Verkuil, supra note 282, at 790. See also Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of 
Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status 
of Overton Park’s Requirement of Judicial Review “On the Record,” 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179 
(1996). 
 328. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 4, § 11.5, at 204 (“An agency action 
that constitutes an unexplained departure from precedent must be reversed as arbitrary and capricious 
. . . .”). 
 329. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–48 (1983) 
(deeming agency rescission of rule arbitrary and capricious on the grounds that agency failed to 
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computerized system would fail this test automatically if contemporaneous 
explanations for changed rules are absent.  
After an automated system has failed, and aggrieved individuals have 
filed lawsuits, agency heads could consult with programmers and 
bureaucrats to ascertain why a certain rule was encoded. But 
administrative law does not recognize post-hoc rationalizations of agency 
actions.330 As the Court has held since the first Chenery331 case, the 
“grounds upon which an administrative action must be judged are those 
upon which the record discloses that its action was based.”332 Precluding 
such after-the-fact explanations ensures that agencies carefully weigh 
policies before imposing them on the public.  
If the court finds that code has effectively created new policy, no 
deference should be accorded the agency’s action. In United States v. 
Mead Corp., the Supreme Court denied Chevron deference to the 
voluminous work of low-level functionaries whose work Congress could 
not plausibly have intended to have the “force of law.”333 Mead suggested 
that formal adjudication, formal or informal rulemaking, or some 
indication in the particular statutory scheme that the agency could make 
legally binding policy through other means was necessary to receive 
deference.334 None of these indications are typically present when 
programmers change policy in building code. Absent Chevron deference, 
courts afford the less-powerful Skidmore deference to the extent that 
agency policy has the “power to persuade.”335 Yet code writers typically 
leave no contemporaneous explanation of their actions that might have the 
potential to persuade under Skidmore. 
Normatively, then, policy changes accomplished through code should 
be reviewed with no deference at all. In practice, however, the reverse is 
true. Because code is hard to unearth, and because of automation bias, 
encoded policy tends to receive even more powerful deference than that 
provided under Chevron.  
 
 
provide factual or evidentiary support for rule); cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 
401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971) (finding agency’s decision to build highway through park arbitrary and 
capricious after hearing because agency failed to explain its decision). 
 330. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the 
administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing 
court.”).  
 331. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 332. Id. at 94; Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 242 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 333. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233–34 (2001). 
 334. Id. at 230–32. 
 335. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 
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Automated systems also generate erroneous adjudications that escape 
judicial review. An automated decision about an individual’s Medicaid 
benefits is an amalgam of different factual determinations. Claimants and 
others report critical information to eligibility workers. Oftentimes, a 
claimant tells information to a variety of workers at different times. Those 
workers interpret that information and enter conclusions into systems that 
do not record the specifics of the information or the identity of those who 
assessed and entered it. Because the system does not retain the 
individual’s data, and because the system does not record the worker’s 
impressions, that information is effectively lost. Although hearing officers 
are typically tasked with reviewing automated decisions regarding public 
benefits de novo,336 the factual predicates for those decisions cannot be 
reviewed.337  
Similarly, an automated system offering finite choices to users 
effectively forces its users to guess the category under which their 
information falls. A poorly expressed question presents the risk that a 
decision will be made without sufficient information and without 
awareness that further information is needed for the decision-making 
process.338 Errors that occur when an individual fails to submit certain 
information will be almost impossible to review administratively or 
judicially because no record exists of the information that an individual 
attempted to communicate or was not prompted to communicate.339 As a 
result, a system’s design may create unreviewable problems for 
individuals. 
Automation jeopardizes due process values, falsifies the central 
assumptions of administrative law, and subverts much of the social 
contract underlying the expansion of the administrative state. The loss of 
such procedural safeguards cannot stand. The next Part lays out a new 
framework to secure technological due process for the automated 
administrative state.  
 
 
 336. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). 
 337. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
 338. AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 26. 
 339. Cf. Diller, supra note 294, at 1201 (noting that techniques that case workers use to dissuade 
applicants from pursuing benefits are insulated from review as agency never denied applicants benefits 
and thus no decisions exist from which the applicants could appeal). 
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III. THE CASE FOR TECHNOLOGICAL DUE PROCESS 
Legal scholars and systems experts must work together to shape the 
contours of due process in this automated age. This Part contributes to that 
effort. At the threshold, it draws upon the rules-versus-standards literature 
to provide a systematic approach to deciding between automation and 
human discretion. It reconceives procedural guarantees for the automated 
age by providing mechanisms to vindicate the norms of due process and 
rulemaking.  
A. Rules and Standards 
Law can take the form of rules, standards, or combinations of each.340 
A rule prescribes ex ante an outcome for a particular fact scenario.341 A 
fifty-mile-per-hour speed limit, for instance, operates as a rule that a police 
officer or clerk cannot change.342 On the other hand, a standard requires 
decision makers to exercise discretion, applying ex post policies to 
events.343 A standard might ask a decision maker to assess whether a 
person drove at a speed that was reasonable under the circumstances.344  
 
 
 340. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
Theorists express dissatisfaction with the rules/standards nomenclature. See RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–28, 72–80 (1978) (calling rules “rules” and standards “principles”); 
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 12–15 (1991); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–1713 (1976). Given the purposes at hand, 
this Article recognizes, but declines to join, this discussion. 
 341. See DWORKIN, supra note 340, at 24; Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 
Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992).  
 342. HART & SACKS, supra note 340, at 139; Sullivan, supra note 341, at 57–58. Interpretive 
practices turn a rule-like provision into something that affords discretion to decision makers. Cass R. 
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 960–65 (1995) (explaining that police officers 
exercise independent judgment in determining whether individuals have transgressed the speed limit). 
 343. Sunstein, supra note 342, at 964–65. 
 344. HART & SACKS, supra note 340, at 140. Administrative and constitutional law often combine 
rules and standards. For instance, procedural due process mandates notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. Although notice and hearings constitute rules, courts determine the contours of such 
requirements through standards. Those standards, in turn, may include subsidiary rules. For example, 
the Court in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 49 (1975), provided a per se rule for the impartiality of 
decision makers.  
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Rules and standards have different goals.345 Rules establish basic 
instructions for behavior.346 They facilitate predictability.347 Because rules 
provide notice of the consequences attached to an activity, the public can 
order its affairs accordingly.348 Rules promote fairness by requiring 
consistent treatment of similar cases.349 They prevent decision makers 
from basing decisions on parties’ perceived attractive qualities.350 Rules 
cut the costs of decision making by eliminating the need to reconsider 
recurring issues.351  
Standards, on the other hand, permit decision makers to tailor an 
outcome to the facts, increasing the likelihood of an “ideal” ruling.352 They 
can account for changing circumstances brought about by technology.353 
Standards also force decision makers to articulate their choices, increasing 
the chance that they will “make visible and accountable the inevitable 
weighing process that rules obscure.”354 
 
 
 345. E.g., DAVIS, supra note 306, at 35; DWORKIN, supra note 340, at 17–39 (outlining theory of 
law based on rules, principles, policies, and standards); SCHAUER, supra note 340, at xv. This Article 
does not provide an exhaustive account of this important debate. Instead, it aims to capture certain 
features of rules and standards that will be helpful in directing an agency’s choice between rules and 
standards in automation decisions and in finding surrogate mechanisms for the automated 
administrative state. 
 346. Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1313 
(2002) (“Rules can serve a useful purpose in establishing stability and basic ‘ground rules’ for the 
Internet.”) 
 347. E.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 
(1989); Kennedy, supra note 340, at 1688–89. 
 348. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72–73 (1944). 
 349. Scalia, supra note 347, at 1178 (“When a case is accorded a different disposition from an 
earlier one, it is important, if the system of justice is to be respected, not only that the later case be 
different, but that it be seen to be so.”); FULLER, supra note 320, at 39. 
 350. Sullivan, supra note 341, at 62; Sunstein, supra note 342, at 974 (explaining that rules can 
counteract bias, favoritism, and discrimination by decision maker). 
 351. SCHAUER, supra note 340, at 147; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621 (1992). 
 352. SCHAUER, supra note 340, at 98. Frederick Schauer explains that unlike standards, a literal 
application of rules runs the risk of “causing the rule to collapse into its underlying justification.” Id. at 
63; Kennedy, supra note 340, at 377–91 (arguing that rule application can produce arbitrary or 
irrational results given substantive ends sought to be realized). For instance, a rigid rule may not fit a 
particular scenario but a bureaucrat may be forced to enforce it without the power to make its 
application sensible. DAVIS, supra note 306, at 52.  
 353. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744–45 (1995).  
 354. Davis, supra note 306, at 67; Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: 
Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821, 825 (1962) (“Open balancing compels a judge to take 
full responsibility for his decisions, and promises a particularized, rational account of how he arrives at 
them—more particularized and more rational at least than the familiar parade of . . . elastic absolutes 
. . . .”). 
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The proper division of law’s work between rules and standards has 
been one of the most hotly debated topics in jurisprudence.355 The 
emergence of automation threatens to overwhelm this debate by giving 
rules a huge, and often decisive, advantage on the basis of cost and 
convenience rather than the desirability of the substantive results they 
produce.356 
The next section provides a framework to navigate between automation 
and discretion in order to avoid the loss of human discretion simply for 
efficiency’s sake.  
B. Automation and Discretion 
Agencies may be inclined to automate many of their policies and to 
adopt policies that can be easily automated. Certainly those who trumpet 
automation’s cost savings, responsiveness, and consistency urge this 
result.357 But agencies should follow a more systematic approach to 
pursuing automation at the expense of human discretion. The rules-versus-
standards literature can help guide an agency’s initial decisions with 
regard to automation.  
Automated systems inherently apply rules because software 
predetermines an outcome for a set of facts.358 Thus, an agency’s choice to 
automate current policies or to adopt new ones that can be automated 
constitutes a decision to govern through rules. As the rules-versus-
standards literature implies, well-implemented automation is preferable to 
human discretion where the need for consistency outweighs the value of 
human discretion. Automation is more attractive where the risks 
associated with human bias outweigh that of automation bias. It is 
advantageous when an issue does not require the exercise of situation-
specific discretion.359  
 
 
 355. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 353, at 1744–45 (arguing that cyberspace should not be governed 
by rules due to rapid changes in the Internet); Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1188 
(2000) (“Cyberspace is too novel and dynamic a medium for anyone to be confident that she has 
gotten policy just right.”). 
 356. As Professors Lawrence Lessig and Jerry Kang note, the digital age may be far better suited 
to governance by standards in situations where rapidly changing technologies will render rules 
obsolete. See supra note 355. This concern certainly applies for any solutions suggested to address the 
automated administrative state where best practices may be subject to change. This Part addresses this 
concern where it is relevant.  
 357. See EGGERS, supra note 18, at 22–27, 118. 
 358. Grimmelmann, supra note 29, at 1732 (“Because software is automated, it operates without 
human discretion.”). 
 359. Id.; see JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY 
THEY DO IT 54 (rev. ed. 2000) (explaining that operators who enter data on social security earnings 
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Decisions best addressed with standards should not be automated.360 
Policies that explicitly or implicitly require the exercise of human 
discretion cannot be automated.361 For instance, agencies should not 
automate policies that allow individuals to plead extenuating 
circumstances that software cannot anticipate.362 Legal materials providing 
that a “decision maker may” take a given action explicitly signal that 
automation is inappropriate.363 Others implicitly do so by including 
indeterminate terms that require decision makers to consider conflicting 
norms that resist precise weighting.364 
Some may suggest that a preservation of discretion in decision-making 
systems merely substitutes a programmer’s policy distortions with a 
human operator’s prejudice or whim. Indeed, policy distortions in code 
would be more likely to contain a mix of positive and negative impacts on 
individuals than would human operators harboring discriminatory motives, 
who would more consistently harm one group and favor another. 
Computer systems, however, can be designed to alleviate some of these 
concerns. Decision systems can outline the factors that operators should 
consider when making judgments.365 Fields can be created to require 
operators to enter the reasons for their decisions and to detail the different 
weight they attached to relevant factors.366 So constructed, decision 
systems would give operators the opportunity to craft “ideal” rulings while 
obtaining a degree of transparency about the basis of the operator’s 
decision.  
The next section lays out legal principles for today’s automated 
systems intended to replace the procedures that automation jeopardizes. 
 
 
into computers are performing mechanical task that can be replaced by machines). 
 360. Grimmelmann, supra note 29, at 1732. Another consideration should be a rule’s complexity. 
AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 46. Although “[s]oftware rules can 
become almost unimaginably complex without their hard edges blurring,” Grimmelmann, supra, at 
1733, the constrained nature of computer languages may limit a programmer’s ability to accurately 
capture a rule’s nuances. See supra notes 61–62. 
 361. See AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 46.  
 362. Grimmelmann, supra note 29, at 1732–33. 
 363. AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 43. 
 364. See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 4 (1992) (describing indeterminate terms as standards); HART, supra note 321, at 124–32 
(discussing open-textured rules); DAVIS, supra note 306, at 78 (explaining that undefined concepts in 
legislation, such as “undesirable,” confer discretionary power on administrators). 
 365. AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 38. 
 366. Id. at 23. 
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C. Procedures Reconceived and Replaced for the Automated State 
1. Protecting Individual Rights 
Automation jeopardizes the due process guarantees of meaningful 
notice and opportunity to be heard. Both technological and legal 
mechanisms can secure meaningful notice, combat automation bias, and 
enhance the accuracy of decisions about constitutionally significant 
individual rights.  
a. Securing Meaningful Notice  
The inadequacy of notice in this automated age must be addressed.367 
At a minimum, automated systems should generate audit trails that record 
the facts and rules supporting their decisions.368 Audit trails should include 
a comprehensive history of decisions made in a case, including the identity 
of the individuals who recorded the facts and their assessment of those 
facts.369 Audit trails should detail the actual rules applied in every mini-
decision that the system makes. With audit trails, agencies would have the 
means to provide individuals with the reasons supporting an automated 
system’s adjudication of their important rights.  
Requiring audit trails would adopt a norm that other countries, such as 
Australia, have embraced.370 It would ensure that agencies uniformly 
provide detailed notice to individuals, no matter the identity of the private 
vendor that built the system. A per se requirement would guard against a 
contractor’s inclination to omit this feature as a cost-saving measure. It 
would facilitate judicial review of the different factual adjudications made 
by human operators.  
Furthermore, audit trails might help to combat a hearing officer’s 
presumption that automated decisions are infallible. By providing a 
detailed map of a computer’s decision-making process, audit trails would 
 
 
 367. In the “No Fly” context, national security concerns may outweigh an individual’s right to 
advanced notice of her “No Fly” status. But in nearly all other instances, courts should insist on strict 
compliance with notice requirements. 
 368. See AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 23; WEITZNER ET AL., 
supra note 197, at 4–5 (describing TAMI software architecture that records justifications for data 
matching and mining “No Fly” determinations to ensure transparency in such systems, including clear 
view of logical, factual, and legal bases for inferences made by system).  
 369. AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 23, 48. This can be 
accomplished by additional prompts that ask operators to describe their thought processes. Some 
jurisdictions, such as Australia, already provide such prompts to operators. Id. 
 370. Id. at 46–47. 
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encourage officers to critically assess the computer’s specific findings. 
Although developing the capability to produce audit trails would have 
initial fixed costs, it would have few variable ones. 
Individual agencies would naturally determine the precise contours of 
such audit trails and the notices they generate. Agencies should ensure that 
their audit trails follow industry best practices.371 They, and reviewing 
courts, should apply the familiar Mullane standard to ensure that the 
system provides sufficient notice.372 This approach would encourage 
agencies to incorporate advances in the design of audit trails into their 
systems.  
b. Protections for Hearings 
Administrative law must confront the automation bias that threatens the 
impartiality of hearing officers and deprives individuals of meaningful 
opportunities to be heard.373 This may be more difficult than avoiding 
hearing officers’ biases for or against particular parties because recusal is 
unlikely to help. Two rules could be employed to combat such bias.  
First, agencies should make it clear to hearing officers that automated 
systems are fallible.374 To that end, hearing officers should receive explicit 
training about the phenomenon of automation bias.375 Studies demonstrate 
that individuals who receive such training are more likely to scrutinize an 
automated system’s suggestions.376 The training of judges has been 
effective in a parallel enterprise. Special workshops on scientific theory 
and methodology have provided needed training to federal district court 
judges charged with assessing the reliability of expert testimony.377  
 
 
 371. A rule prescribing the exact contours of an audit trail would surely be inadvisable given the 
rapidity of change in technology and industry best practices. 
 372. See supra text accompanying notes 204–06 (discussing due process notice formulation of 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950)).  
 373. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text (discussing the phenomenon of automation 
bias and its risks). 
 374. See John K. Hawley, Patriot Fratricides: The Human Dimension Lessons of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, FIELD ARTILLERY, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 18, available at http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/ 
2006/JAN_FEB_2006/JAN_FEB_06_PAGES_18_19.pdf (arguing that soldiers operating automated 
aircraft systems need to be aware that computerized system is fallible so that soldiers can provide 
meaningful check on system’s decisions). 
 375. See Skitka et al., supra note 151, at 94 (arguing that automation bias can be dispelled by 
training decision makers about phenomenon).  
 376. Id.; cf. Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1098–99 
(2006) (drawing parallels between movement in antidiscrimination law to redesign workplace design 
to combat implicit cognitive bias and the response in information privacy scholarship to implicit 
cognitive limitations of actors in information transactions).  
 377. Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/2
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Second, agencies should require hearing officers to explain, in detail, 
their reliance on an automated system’s decision.378 Officers should 
identify the computer-generated facts or legal findings on which they 
relied in making their decisions. This accords with administrative law’s 
longstanding faith in the prophylactic power of requiring explicit 
statements of reasons. Asking hearing officers to evaluate the basis for 
their decisions would further mitigate the effects of automation bias.379  
Fighting automation bias is a logical next step from Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.380 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.381 In 
those cases, the Court upheld the exclusion of unreliable expert testimony 
due to the jury’s inability to reject evidence carrying the imprimatur of 
science or engineering.382 If the Seventh Amendment countenances taking 
issues away from juries due to the risks of scientific bias,383 surely 
administrative law can similarly address automation bias. These suggested 
requirements are certainly less invasive than the exclusion of evidence in 
Daubert and Kumho. Requiring warnings and statements of reasons would 
be the equivalent of cautionary instructions, not flat bans on officers beset 
by automation bias. 
Providing a means to combat the effects of automation bias would not 
undermine the Court’s traditional reluctance to dissect the motives of 
decision makers. In United States v. Morgan,384 an agency head publicly 
announced his disappointment about the Court’s reversal of an earlier 
decision of his agency.385 Addressing allegations of bias, the Court refused 
to assess the administrator’s convictions on matters of policy.386 The Court 
reasoned that decision makers are presumed to be persons of “conscience 
and intellectual discipline.”387  
The reporting and warning requirements would not transgress the letter 
or the spirit of Morgan. They would not entail an individual assessment of 
 
 
1677 (1998). 
 378. Cummings, supra note 147, at 4.  
 379. Id. (requiring operators to explain extent to which they relied on automation leads to fewer 
instances of bias). 
 380. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 381. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 382. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; Kumho, 526 U.S. at 158; see ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, 
EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL DUE 
PROCESS 232 (2007) (arguing that judicial gatekeeping of scientific evidence is matter of due process 
and fairness due to risk of overreliance on junk science by juries). 
 383. BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 382, at 232. 
 384. 313 U.S. 409 (1941). 
 385. Id. at 420. 
 386. Id. at 420–21. 
 387. Id. at 421. 
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a particular hearing officer’s inclination to adopt computerized decisions. 
Instead, they would erect safeguards to dispel the influence of automation 
bias without intruding on and evaluating a particular judge’s thought 
process. 
Reconceptualizing the Mathews balancing test would also help 
individuals to receive meaningful hearings. As suggested in Part II,388 the 
Mathews analysis needs a more realistic way to compare the fixed costs of 
corrective action with the future benefits of that correction.389 The 
theoretical foundations of Mathews would, in turn, reflect the new realities 
of the automated administrative state. It might countenance requiring 
additional costs in cases where retrofitting an automated system’s 
reasoning was essential to enabling individuals to address an agency’s 
intended actions.  
For instance, a reconceived Mathews test might permit hearings on 
flaws in the CBMS software in a case involving a child whose Medicaid 
benefits were abruptly terminated. Because CBMS does not generate audit 
trails, and because automation bias will likely influence the hearing 
officer, expert testimony would be critical to demonstrate that the 
computer decision is flawed. If experts discover a distortion in the 
encoded policy that, once fixed, would avoid errors in thousands of other 
cases, the Mathews analysis might support such additional process. In the 
“No Fly” context, if independent advisory boards were provided testing 
data that included false positives, the system might be recalibrated to be 
more accurate. Coupled with measures to combat automation bias, this 
approach would vindicate due process values for the automated 
administrative state.  
2. Replacing Rulemaking Procedures 
Automated systems must be designed with transparency and 
accountability as their primary objectives, so as to prevent inadvertent and 
procedurally defective rulemaking. This approach incorporates several 
basic norms of behavior.  
First, vendors should release systems’ source codes to the public.390 
Opening up the source code would reveal how a system works.391 It would 
 
 
 388. See supra text accompanying notes 243–53. 
 389. See supra text accompanying notes 248–50. 
 390. See Citron, supra note 32 (arguing that the release of various information systems’ source 
codes used by agencies, including decision-making systems, would advance various models of the 
administrative state); Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE 
AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 358 (Joseph Feller et al. eds., 2005). 
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shed light on the policies encoded in it.392 The Office of Management and 
Budget could issue a circular conditioning the provision of federal funding 
for technology purchases on the use of open code.393 A state budget office 
could do the same for local purchases receiving state aid.394 Alternatively, 
legislators could mandate open code systems.395 Certain systems such as 
the “No Fly” program, however, might fall outside an open code mandate 
because public safety concerns might outweigh transparency’s benefits.396 
One might argue that the public’s ability to identify encoded policy 
changes would force agencies to engage in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, the costs and delays of which have already caused it to fall 
into disuse. This concern, however, is inapplicable in cases where the 
public has identified programming mistakes that can be fixed. For 
example, a software glitch may have caused CBMS to apply illegal 
income and asset requirements to breast cancer patients on Medicaid.397 
There, the agency programmers may have understood established policy, 
but nonetheless executed it improperly. An open code system would help 
ensure the correction of encoded policy without involving expensive 
rulemaking procedures.  
This argument, however, does indeed have force in cases where 
programmers’ interpretations establish new rules. CBMS’s inquiry about 
whether individuals seeking food stamps were “beggars” arguably falls 
into that category.398 Programmers’ translations of policy into code 
inevitably involve some interpretation, and it would be impossible to force 
 
 
 391. David M. Berry & Giles Moss, Free and Open-Source Software: Opening and 
Democratising e-Government’s Black Box, 11 INFO. POLITY 21, 23 (2006).  
 392. Dr. John Henry Clippinger, Senior Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at 
The Harvard Law School and Director of the Open Identity Meta-system, suggests that programmers 
write the code in natural languages, which lend themselves to policy commands and are easier to read. 
Comments of Dr. John Henry Clippinger, Podcast, Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard 
Law School, “Danielle Citron on Technological Due Process,” Jan. 15, 2008, http://blogs.law.harvard. 
edu/mediaberkman/2008/01/15/danielle-citron-on-technological-due-process-podcast/.  
 393. Citron, supra note 32. 
 394. Id. 
 395. See Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy Implications of Open 
Source Software, 9 VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 61 (2006). 
 396. Citron, supra note 32. 
 397. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing programming error that imposed 
income and asset limits on breast cancer patients on Medicaid in violation of federal and state law). 
 398. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing CBMS inquiry into applicant’s status 
as a “beggar”). Agency programmers seemingly did not generate notes documenting their thought 
processes while building the decision tables. My FOIA request for the decision tables and 
accompanying notes only yielded the decision table fixes that I cite throughout the Article. Such notes, 
however, would be fruitful in ascertaining whether the question “Are you a beggar?” can be attributed 
to policy interpretations made by programmers or bureaucrats.  
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agencies to write rules on every possible interpretation of a rule. But 
certain interpretations, such as the “beggar” inquiry, arguably exceed what 
would constitute a permissible interpretation and instead arbitrarily create 
new rules that deserve notice-and-comment rulemaking.399 If so, an agency 
should consult with programmers before publishing its notice of proposed 
rulemaking in order to clearly establish the precise rule that would be 
automated.  
Second, agencies should be required to test a system’s software.400 
Agencies should maintain testing suites that run expected and unexpected 
hypothetical scenarios designed by independent policy experts through 
decision systems to expose distorted policy.401 Agencies should invest 
resources into designing such suites, which should include many complex 
and varied cases with expected outcomes.402  
Testing protocols should be run before a system’s launch, during 
implementation, and every time policies change. Federal procurement 
regulations could require contracts to specify that decision systems pass 
testing suites before states can accept systems from vendors.403 This would 
prevent programmers who otherwise might test a system from foregoing 
testing in the face of dwindling resources.404  
Rigorous testing reflects a norm of proper software development.405 
Testing would help identify and eliminate a programmer’s bias.406 It would 
 
 
 399. See, e.g., Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 169–72 (7th Cir. 1996) (striking down 
interpretative rule imposing eight-foot fence requirement as a procedurally defective rule that required 
notice-and-comment because interpretation was arbitrary choice that did not necessarily derive from 
the rule). 
 400. AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 40, 45; PETE GOODLIFFE, 
CODE CRAFT: THE PRACTICE OF WRITING EXCELLENT CODE 130 (2007); Mark Underseth, A Test-
Driven Approach to Developing Embedded Software, EVALUATION ENGINEERING, Apr. 2007, at 44. 
Testing is a term of art that includes a variety of methodologies. GOODLIFFE, supra, at 130. Naturally, 
the particular type of testing that should be used would be determined by systems specialists who 
could identify the “best practices” for testing a particular system. 
 401. See Comments of Dr. John Henry Clippinger, supra note 392. Although outcome testing 
cannot cover every possible situation, the Australian government notes that it would test enough 
scenarios for agencies to have a high level of comfort in the rules embedded in the system. AUS. ADM. 
REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 45.  
 402. To address policy changes and possible leaks to vendors, the contents of the testing suite 
should be constantly evolving and expanding. 
 403. I thank my colleague David Super for this insightful point. 
 404. See Terry Shepard, Margaret Lamb, & Diane Kelly, More Testing Should be Taught, 44 
COMM. OF THE ACM, June 2001, at 103, 104 (explaining that because testing is usually allocated at end 
of software development process, it bears brunt of resource constraints). It may be worth considering 
whether the details of testing protocols should be kept confidential to prevent vendors from “teaching” 
to the test by inserting hidden work-arounds into the system so that it produces the right answers in the 
testing suite.  
 405. AUS. ADM. REV., AUTOMATED ASSISTANCE, supra note 69, at 21; GOODLIFFE, supra note 
400, at 130 (explaining that testing is central to building software). 
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pinpoint policies that have been altered in their translation to code.407 
Testing would identify software bugs that distort policy. Although testing 
would not provide all of the benefits of obtaining public comment on 
proposed rules, it would provide a critical layer of assurance about the 
content of encoded policy and the algorithms employed by systems.408  
To be sure, testing would entail fixed costs. But it would add negligible 
variable ones. It is certainly cheaper, and arguably more precise, to find 
defects in a computer program’s decisions before its implementation than 
it is to uncover ex post a software program’s flaws in individual cases.  
Despite the fact that rigorous testing is a baseline requirement of 
software development, independent contractors did not adequately test 
CBMS or TIERS before those systems went live.409 This caused many of 
the problems that currently plague those systems. Absent a testing 
requirement, contractors seeking to submit the lowest bid are unlikely to 
build testing costs into their project budgets. As state and federal agencies 
automate more of their decisions, often relying upon many of the same 
private contractors,410 a uniform testing rule is essential.  
Trial-run testing embodies the notion that the accountability of 
rulemaking can be replaced with an adjudication involving interested 
parties. In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,411 the Court allowed the agency to 
make policy through such adjudications in lieu of formal or informal 
rulemaking.412 The Court explained that adjudicative procedures can 
produce “relevant information necessary to mature and fair consideration 
of the issues” in the same way that rulemaking generates informed views 
of affected groups.413  
Testing would serve as a substitute, albeit an imperfect one, for the 
interested parties of Bell Aerospace. Testing provides a set of hypothetical 
scenarios to reveal software’s flaws.414 Although broad public 
 
 
 406. Friedman & Nissenbaum, supra note 77, at 344 (arguing in favor of rules regarding testing of 
software to detect programmer bias). 
 407. GOODLIFFE, supra note 400, at 130; Underseth, supra note 400, at 44. 
 408. See Grimmelmann, supra note 29, at 1738 (“The ambition of software engineering is to 
remove the most important bugs and reduce the unpredictable errors (i.e., ‘wrong’ decisions) to a 
tolerable level, not to eliminate them entirely.”). 
 409. See supra notes 139, 145–47 (discussing involvement of EDS and Accenture in building 
CBMS and TIERS). 
 410. See supra note 65 (detailing role that EDS will play in building future Medicaid automated 
systems). 
 411. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
 412. Id. at 295. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Dr. John Henry Clippinger and Gene Koo, Senior Fellow and Fellow, respectively, at the 
Berkman Center on the Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, both suggested that vendors 
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participation naturally would not occur in testing regimes, the set of 
scenarios designed to expose a system’s errors would serve as a surrogate 
for clients adjudicating cases, which would reveal a software flaw.415  
Third, agencies should explore ways to allow the public to participate 
in the building of automated decision systems. Such participation is not 
without precedent.416 For instance, states and localities have established 
welfare reform boards that create opportunities for the public to participate 
in setting welfare policy.417 The City of Denver has a Welfare Reform 
Board, consisting of appointees of the Mayor, representatives of the 
business community, service providers, and welfare recipients.418 
In the same vein, agencies could establish information technology 
review boards that would provide opportunities for stakeholders and the 
public at large to comment on a system’s design and testing. Although 
finding the ideal makeup and duties of such boards would require some 
experimentation, they would secure opportunities for interested groups to 
comment on the construction of automated systems that would have an 
enormous impact on their communities once operational.  
Last, agencies might consider refraining from automating policy that 
has not undergone formal or informal rulemaking procedures, such as 
interpretative rules and policy statements. The public and often elected 
officials have not had the opportunity to respond to these policies.419 
Programmers encoding interpretative rules and policy statements are 
simply too far removed from the democratic process to justify the 
significant risk of distorted policy that automation entails.420 Although 
adherence to rulemaking procedures would not solve the accountability 
 
 
establish testing suites before a system’s official launch. See Comments of Dr. John Henry Clippinger 
and Gene Koo, supra note 392. Bureaucrats and interested stakeholders should be permitted to submit 
unusual scenarios for testing. Id. The testing of such scenarios would allow vendors to identify 
problems that plague these systems. Id.  
 415. Surrogate advocacy plays an important role in administrative law. Because of principles 
against retroactive application of new policies and doctrines keeping alive mooted disputes capable of 
repetition yet evading review, some litigants in landmark cases before administrative agencies—and 
courts—actually have little immediate stake in the outcome of their litigation.  
 416. Diller, supra note 294, at 1213 (giving examples of such public participation in welfare 
administration). 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. 
 419. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000) (interpretative rules and policy statements are not subject to 
notice-and-comment requirement); see supra notes 285–86 (defining interpretative rules and policy 
statements). 
 420. Policy statements also should not be automated because such statements should not be 
designed to control rights and duties of individuals, which is precisely what automation would 
accomplish. See Anthony, supra note 277, at 1315 (arguing that agencies are not entitled to make 
policy statements binding). 
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deficit accompanying today’s inadvertent delegation of legislative power 
to code writers, it would allay some of these concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article engages in a crucial conversation about means to protect 
our due process values in this age of automation. In an earlier era, 
legislators and judges embarked on a project to safeguard the interests of 
individuals without stifling the administrative state’s expansion. Their 
efforts produced the twin procedural regimes governing individual 
adjudications and policymaking.  
Automation demands that we revisit that project. Automation has 
enormous potential to eliminate persistent errors in human-based systems 
and to produce consistent decisions. But today’s decision systems fail to 
take advantage of the potential for error correction and indeed become 
devices for error propagation themselves. This Article offers a model of 
technological due process that would protect individuals’ interest in fair, 
accountable, and transparent adjudications and rulemaking without 
forgoing the benefits offered by computerized decision systems.  
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